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Summary  findings
Nayar compares Indonesian labor legislations with labor  appear to be at least as generous as legislation in the five
policies in five other APEC countries: Chile, the  other countries, which all have substantially higher per
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and the United  capita incomes.
States. She focuses on legislation affecting union  Indonesia is under pressure to ease restrictions on
regulation, minimum wages, nonwage compensation,  unions. Nayar suggests that allowing effective plant-level
and working conditions.  bargaining could give workers more of a voice at the
Current legislation in Indonesia is a mixed bag of laws  workplace, but that improving industrial relations will
protecting workers' welfare but controlling organized  require more than legislative changes. Careful changes in
labor. Indonesian laws restrict the ability of labor  legislation and in industrial relations - and increased
organizations to effectively represent workers to  deregulation and competition  in product markets -
management at the plant level. In this, they are similar to  could help unions play a more positive role, while
Malaysian laws and, to less extent, new Korean  downplaying labor's more negative role.
legislation. They provide a stark contrast to current  She cautions against centrally mandating labor
legislation in Chile and the United States.  standards instead of letting workers and their employers
But Indonesian legislation governing minimum wages,  negotiate them at local plants.
mandated nonwage benefits, and other labor standards
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The rapid growth in manufacturing  exports and employment  since the mid-eighties  in Indonesia
has been accompanied  by increasing attention abroad to the rights and welfare of Indonesian  labor.
Formal complaints  of Indonesia's  record in labor affairs were issued  by two major bodies in 1987-88.
The International  Confederation  of Free Trade Unions  (ICFTU) complained  to the ILO, Geneva  about
the lack of trade union freedom in Indonesia,  and in 1987 the AFL-CIO (The American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations),  petitioned the US Trade Representative  (USTR) to
remove Indonesia's  GSP privileges because of its poor record on worker rights.  In June 1992, Asia
Watch and the International  Labor Rights Education  and Research  Fund (ILRERF)  petitioned  the USTR
to review Indonesian labor rights practices.  The charges include violation of rights to freedom of
association,  to bargain collectively  and strike, and of the ban on forced labor.  A review was initiated
in 1992  to determine  Indonesia's  compliance  with the worker rights provisions  of the GSP lawl/.
Within Indonesia, there has been a marked increase in labor unrest in the 1990's.  Wages,
especially failure to comply with minimum wage legislation2/ and inequitable impacts of minimum
wage legislation, and restrictions on freedom of association  were among the most frequent causes of
strikes.  Workers also  demanded non-wage compensation  such as paid vacation and sick leave,
participation  in the social  insurance  scheme,  and improvement  of working  conditions. Labor leaders and
a number  of NGOs  (in particular, the Legal Aid Institute,  YLBHI)  in Indonesia  have voiced  protests over
abuses of labor rights and have been pressing for change in a number  of laws that restrict the freedom
of workers to organize particularly  in laws relating to the resolution  of disputes (military involvement,
treatment  of striking workers  and labor activists)  and also on registration  of independent  unions.
In late 1993 and early 1994, the government responded  to these criticisms by announcing  its
sympathy  for worker rights and welfare.  The government  also repealed a controversial  decree on the
involvement  of the military  in labor  disputes, increased  the minimum  wage, set a deadline  for compliance
with minimum  wages  and union  representation,  granted  permission  for organizations  other than  the single
officially  recognized  union to engage in collective  bargaining, etc.  The criticisms  however, continue  as
does the labor unrest, and Asia Watch and other NGOs charge that a number of the legislative  changes
are superficial  and inadequate.
The international  concern for labor rights and standards in an increasingly  integrated world
economy has at least two distinct motivations. The first is a humanitarian  one, basic human rights
considerations  on the use of prison or forced labor, child labor, blatant restrictions on freedom of
association  and organization, etc.  The concern is that the growth resulting from increased trade and
investment  should  not be at the cost of workers; rather that they should  be able to share in the benefits
of growth.  The economic  motivation  to impose  international  labor standards  is based on the argument
1/In June 1993,  the U.S. Government  had given  Indonesia  until  mid-February  1994  to demonstrate  progress  in
protecting  worker  rights  provisions  of the  GSP  law. A US Trade  Delegation  visited  Indonesia  in September  1993
on invitation  by the  Indonesian  Government.  On Feb 16, 1994  the US Trade  Representative  decided  to "suspend
but not finally  terminate"  its review  of Indonesian  labor  rights  policies  and to revisit  the  issue  in August.
2/ The  government  responded  to the increasing  international  scrutiny  with  a strengthening  of the minimum  wage
legislation  beginning  in 1989. The  reluctance  of employers  to comply  and  the increased  awareness  by workers  of
rights  was  associated  with  further  unrest.- 2 -
that low-wage developing  countries have lower labor costs as a result of denial of decent wages and
working conditions  which gives them a competitive  edge in an inter-linked  world economy. Some fear
that this will force producers  in countries  with high labor standards  to lower their standards,  thus leading
to a  "destructive  race for  the bottom.3/"  Developing countries, on  the other hand, charge that
developed  countries are motivated  by protectionist  intentions: linking  unrealistic labor standards with
trade raises labor costs in developing  countries  and protects their own positions  in  world trade.
This paper puts Indonesian  labor legislation  in a comparative  perspective. Labor market policies
in Indonesia  are compared with those in five other APEC countries: Malaysia, Korea, Mexico, Chile
and the United States.  The paper focuses on legislation  regulating  unions, minimum wage laws and
payroll taxes and employer mandates  for non-wage  compensation,  and other labor standards (such as
hours of work, etc.), areas which are the subject  of current concern  in Indonesia. It should  be noted  that
important  labor market policies relating  to training, severance  pay, etc. are not covered.
The comparison  shows that Indonesian  labor market policies are a mixed bag of protectionist
legislation  and controls  over organized  labor.  While legislation  regulating  unions does make it difficult
for workers  to organize and enter into effective  collective  bargaining  with employers  (in this respect  being
very similar to the other two East Asian countries, and indeed, Chile until the end of the last decade),
Indonesian  minimum  wage legislation  and labor standards  are at least as generous as those in the other
countries  studied,  all of which are at a considerably  advanced  level of development. The paper suggests
that there may be a positive role that effective  plant level collective  bargaining can play and cautions
against  using centrally  mandated  labor standards  in lieu of terms of employment  negotiated  in a bipartite
manner.
Section  II presents a brief background  of Industrial  Relations  in Indonesia,  drawing  mainly from
a recent paper by Chris Manning (1993). Section III presents Indonesian  labor market legislation  and
compares them with those in the other five countries discussing in turn collective labor relations,
minimum  wages, social security  systems  and other labor standards. Section  IV concludes.
II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND  OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDONESIA
In a recent survey article, Chris Manning4/  contrasts  the tightly controlled industrial relations
system which emerged  in Indonesia  after 1965  with the labor activism  of the Sukarno  era.  An extensive
labor protection system (including  a 40-hour work week, and the right to maternity and menstruation
3/These  concerns  have  led to unilateral  decisions  by individual  governments  or regional  grouping  to introduce  a
.social clause"  in their external  relations,  linking  trade with labor standards  (The US Omnibus  Trade and
Competitiveness  Act  of 1988  makes  violation  of labor  rights  an 'unfair' trade  practice  actionable  under  section  301
of the U.S Trade  law.). The  social  clause  is the  subject  of current  debate  which  is concerned  with issues  such  as
the  extent  to which  such  concerns  should  be expressed  in a charter,  where  the  line  should  be drawn,  and whether
trade  policy  instruments  should  be used.  While  there is more consensus  on prohibiting  blatant  human  rights
violations,  and  having  international  labor  standards  that  are  consistent  with  the  level  of development  of the  country,
there  is less  agreement  over  specifics.  Moreover,  the  debate  over  whether  trade  policy  is the  appropriate  instrument
is far from  resolved.
4/Manning,  1993  is an excellent  survey  of the evolution  of the Indonesian  industrial  relations  system  and labor
welfare  in the New  Order  period. This  section  draws  heavily  from  that  article.- 3 -
leave for women) was introduced in Indonesia  after independence  and was supplemented  by the mid
1950s  by additional  laws regulating  industrial  accident compensation  and procedures, labor inspection,
child  and female  work, and the drawing  up and reporting  of collective  labor agreements. These  policies
on labor protection  and trade unions represented  a radical change  from the pre-colonial  period.  By the
mid-1950's  the union movement  comprised  of a total membership  of around 2 million,  representing  about
20% of all employees,  in 13 federations  with close links to political  parties. About half of all registered
union members were  in the  communist supported SOBSI (All  Indonesia Workers Organization).
However, the difficulty  of reconciling  union freedom and industrial  disputes with the requirements  of
economic  stability  and growth, and the perceived  threat from organized labor to economic  stability  led
to the introduction  of increased controls  (such as the dispute resolution  law, Basic Law No. 22, 1957,
which is currently in effect) and measures which set the precedent for military intervention  in labor
affairs.
These controls were intensified  after the military assumed power in  1965, partly for political
reasons, but also because  the new government  was not prepared  to allow the possibility  of labor unrest
to discourage  private investment,  which it began to regard as essential  for economic  rehabilitation. The
banning  of the communist  party (PKI), the much more direct role of the army in political life and the
elimination  of effective  political opposition  was associated  with parallel changes  in the labor movement.
The leftist union was banned  and its leaders removed  from the industrial  relations scene, the close links
between  political  parties and labor were broken by an extension  of government  control over and fusion
of political  parties, and military  and police intervention  in labor affairs  increased. A unified  trade union
movement  was now considered  essential  for political and economic  stability  and growth. Thus, what is
now the SPSI5/ was formed in 1973, consisting  of members of existing trade unions who disbanded
and joined the new organization. The government introduced 'panca sila' labor relations, based on
principles rejecting  conflict  between  interests of workers and management  and emphasizing  cooperation
anid  conciliation;  and this served as the ideological  framework  behind  a policy agenda  which emphasized
control  of labor unrest and strikes in order to encourage  investment. The SPSI grew to become a large
and complex organization and had an estimated membership of slightly under  1 million in  1991.
Although  membership  figures suggest  that unions were represented in about one-third of all enterprises
with 25 employees  or more, the percentage  of all employees  or only manufacturing  employees  (5-10%)
that were even nominal union members in the early 1990's was much lower than during the Sukarno
period. As seen in Table 1, the proportion  of the non-agricultural  labor force that is currently  unionized
is by far the lowest in Indonesia  while being roughly comparable  in the other 5 APEC countries.
Following a  spurt of labor unrest and  recession in the late  1970's to  mid-1980's6/,  the
government introduced further controls over  labor.  The increased unrest  was in  part  due  to
macroeconomic  conditions  and in part due to inefficient  dispute  mechanisms  and tight  government  control
over the SPSI which did not serve as an effective representative  of workers in enterprises.  The
continuing  conditions  of labor  surplus  was  probably  the driving  reason for the workers' lack of bargaining
power.  Moreover, in this pre-manufacturing  exports era/liberalization  era, international  and domestic
criticism of labor conditions was not a major issue of concern.  However, further controls were
introduced  due to continuing  government  anxiety  not to discourage  new investment  considered  central  to
economic  strategy in the post-oil boom period.  The new measures weakened  the SPSI even further,
reduced  the independence  of unions at the enterprise  level, discouraged  genuine  collective  bargaining  and
increased  the responsibility  of the Ministry of Manpower  in labor affairs.  This was also the period in
5/lt was then known  as the FBSI (the All-Indonesia  Labor Federation).
6/See Table 2.- 4 -
which the controversial  Ministerial Decree No. 342 (recently repealed in response to international
criticism)  strengthening  the role of the military on labor affairs, was passed.
About the same  time (mid-eighties),  the Government  began  to make a serious  policy commitment
to manufacturing  exports.  This was closely associated with greater international  scrutiny of labor
standards which in turn fuelled mounting  domestic criticism. The Government,  now more concerned
about the international  (and domestic) scrutiny, responded  particularly by focusing on minimum wage
legislation  beginning  in 1989. As seen in Tables  2 and 3, the lack of compliance  with the new legislation
(aggravated  by the limited  enforcement  mechanisms,  too few inspectors  and lack of effective  plant level
unionism  and dispute resolution  mechanisms)  was one of the major reasons  for the increased incidence
of strikes in the early 1990's.  In addition to tight labor controls, Chris Manning attributes  the rise in
unrest (which  was now more concentrated  in the relatively  low wage but typically  large, export oriented
textiles, clothing and footwear  industries  than in the high wage, capital intensive industries  particularly
in the greater Jakarta region)  to the greater vulnerability  of the government  to international  and domestic
criticism,  higher  levels of awareness  and education  among  workers  and to rising expectations  about  labor
standards  rather than to lower wages  in the export oriented  industries  relative  to other industries  or to the
rest of Indonesia. The stagnant  trend in real wages  (in agriculture  as well as industry  during the second
half of the eighties)  was a direct result of the continuing  labor surplus conditions.
III.  INDONESIAN  LABOR  LEGISLATION  IN A COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVE
The range of labor legislation  existing  today in Indonesia  (a mixed bag of pro-welfare  legislation
and labor controls) can thus be understood in part in the historical context outlined above.  In the
following subsections key features of the labor laws are compared with those in five other APEC
countries  to see which aspects  are relatively  more pro-labor  and which aspects  are more repressive  and
to get a sense of Indonesian  labor standards  relative to its level of development. Indonesian  policies are
compared with those in two other East Asian countries (Korea and Malaysia), two Latin American
countries  (Chile  and Mexico),  and the United  States. The other East  Asian and Latin American  countries
have (purchasing  power corrected)  per capita incomes  that range from 2.5-3 times that of Indonesia's.
United States  per capita income is about 8 times  that of Indonesia's. Following  the comparison  of each
labor market institution  is a discussion  of the rationale  for and potential  impacts  of each set of institutions
and brief summary  of available  empirical  evidence.
The primary sources of the legislation  are the official  labor codes in the various countries. For
Indonesia, the discussion  is based on legislation  that is valid at the time of writing.  For all the other
countries,  the legislation  discussed  was valid at least until the early 1990's.  The discussion  focuses  on
legislation  that applies  to the majority of wage workers in the private sector.
A.  Collective  Labor Relations
In 1993, the U.S. Trade Representative  put Indonesia  on a list of developing  countries that risk
losing tariff concessions  now received  on some of their exports to the US under the generalized  system
of preferences (GSP).  The decision on whether to suspend  Indonesia's privileges was initially due in
February 1994  at which time the review of Indonesian  labor rights policies was suspended  and the issue
was to be revisited in August.  A GSP mission visited Indonesia in August/September  1994 and the
dialogue  is still in process.- 5 -
The main criteria used by the U.S. for evaluating  labor market practices are the extent to which
countries afford their workers basic rights which include the freedom to form unions and to bargain
collectively,  as well as a minimum  working  age, prohibition  of forced labor, and minimum  standards  for
wages, hours and health and safety. The most important  of these issues in the case of Indonesia  concern
the rights of workers  to organize and to bargain  collectively,  and the involvement  of the military  in labor
affairs  (security forces are apparently  used to arrest picketers and workers trying to organize  collective
bargaining  and to monitor workers).  In the rest of this section, legislation  regulating  collective  labor
relations  in Indonesia  are compared  with those in the other 5 APEC countries.
Workers organizations  in these countries  range from powerful  politically  linked  trade unions in
Mexico  to weak union systems  in the other two East Asian countries which have a common  history of
elimination  of  communist unions and delinking of unions with politics, to  Chile where a  similar
weakening  and repression of unions was followed  by the implementation  of labor policy reform in the
early eighties.  The powerful trade unions in Mexico  operate in close alliance with Mexico's dominant
political party (the PRI)7/ through the Mexican Workers Confederation  (CTM)_/;  these close links
are said to have negative  impacts on union democracy. In Korea, the only legally  allowed and not yet
independent  center (the FKTU)  now coexists  with  several independent  unions which  have formed  regional
and industrial councils, reflecting the recent history of alternating repression and unrest and some
liberalization  of labor controls9/.  In  Malaysia, relatively independent  unionism is weakened by the
considerable  government  power in  the regulation  of unions which it has been using in recent years to
impose  in-house  unions in preference  to industry  unions. Moreover, freedom of association  is restricted
in export processing zones.  In Chile,  there has been a steady increase in the proportion of the
workforce affiliated  to unions, in the affiliation  to federations  and confederations  and in the number of
collective bargaining agreements signed, particularly since 1989.  And in  the U.S.,  decentralized
collective  bargaining  has typically  determined  labor contracts;  the steady  decline  in the proportion  of the
workforce  that is unionized  and a decline  in the prevalence  of collective  bargaining  are issues  of current
concern in labor-management  relations.
Freedom  of Association.  Formation  of Independent  Worker Organizations  and Collective  Bargaining
The Indonesian Constitutionlo/ says that  "freedom of  association and assembly" shall be
prescribed by statute. There are two such laws which clearly guarantee  the right to form unions.  The
first is Law No. 18 of 1956 which made the ILO Convention  No. 98 on the Right to Organize and
Bargain Collectively,  ratified  by Indonesia  in 1957, a law.  The second is the Basic  Law No. 14 of 1969
which explicitly states "the right to  set up  and  to become a  member of  a  manpower union."
Unionization  rates in Indonesia,  however, are substantially  lower than those in the other five countries
and are among the lowest in the world.  There is only a single legally  recognized  union in the private
sector, the SPSI (All Indonesia  Workers Union), which is for all practical purposes a government
2/Despite  the statutory  prohibition  against  "interfering  in political  matters".
8/Similar  in many  respects  to the AFL-CIO  in the U.S.
9/For a brief  sununary  of the  history  of industrial  relations  in the two  east  Asian  countries,  see Freernan,  1993.
10/The  right  to form  a labor  union  was  explicitly  mentioned  in the  provisional  constitution  of 1950. However,  in
the 1945  Constitution  which  was  reinstated  in 1959  and  valid  today,  the  right  to organize  was  left  to be determined
in future  laws. See Adiwinata,  Katz  and Katz  (1974).- 6 -
controlled  institution. Further, although  8000 of the 37000  companies  with more than 25 workers have
collective labor agreements (cla) and 23000 of the remaining  have company regulations in lieu of
collective labor agreementsll/,  several observers and researchers claim that only a handful of these
cia's represent  the outcome of genuine collective  bargaining  between  workers and employers.
The lack of genuine representation  of workers and effective collective  bargaining at the plant
level is attributed in part to government  regulation  which makes it impossible  to set up alternate legal
worker  organizations  to the SPSI and its affiliated  plant level organizations.  The government  has recently
brought out new regulations  in an attempt  to  address some  of these criticisms. Until recently, the only
recognized union was the SPSI.  However, the government has for  some time been considering
decentralizing  the SPSI, in effect returning to its earlier structure (when it was the FBSI) in which
independent  unions were affiliated  to the FBSI federation. In October 1993, the SPSI began  the process
of decentralizing,  and 12 of its 13 industrial sectors were subsequently  given the right to register as
independent  industrial  unions federated  with the SPSI.  The SPSI will now assume the role of national
trade union center and the formal legal changes  will be completed  by the SPSI convention  in October
1995. However, government  decrees effectively  prevent  the formation  of independent  unions (see Fane
1994, American Embassy, 1994) as specific requirements  have to be met for recognition.
While workers in the private sector, including  those in export processing  zones, are free to form
worker organizations  or company  level unions, only registered  unions can negotiate  binding collective
labor agreements with employers.  In February 1993, a  new regulation eased the organizational
requirements  for a union to receive  recognition  from the Department  of Manpower. Yet the conditions
for recognition  are still considered  to be rather restrictivel2/.  Recent regulations  have also increased
the ability  of for new unions to form and negotiate  contracts at the plant level.  According  to a Ministry
of Manpower  Regulation  (No. PER. 01/MEN/January  1994), workers may set up plant level unions in
companies  with more than 25 workers which do not already have established unions as long as it is
approved  by more than 50% of the existing workers.  Only one union is permitted in each company.
These new unions (which may not include persons executing  the functions of managementl3/) may
enter into binding collective  labor agreements. Other articles in the regulation  say that the corporate
unions "can establish  cooperation  with or be affiliated  to the All-Indonesia  Labor Union"  (SPSI)  and that
they are "recommended  to join the All-Indonesia  Labor Union of relevant  business sectors" within 12
months from their establishment  thus raising questions  about  the independence  of these new unions and
their ability  to represent  the workers.  The Ministry  of Manpower  reports that there are about  60 of these
new plant level unions, and the first cla was signed this September. Several NGO's and observers also
claim that these unions are basically "yellow  unions"  which are being set up by employers  (and are
being pushed  by the government  in response  to the international  criticism).
1  1/Unofficial  numbers  from  the Ministry  of Manpower.
12/ A federation  of trade  unions  may  register  as long  as it has  representation  in 5 of Indonesia's  27 provinces,  a
minimum  of 25  branches  at  the  regional  level,  at least  100  workplace/factory  trade  union  units,  and  have  a minimum
membership  of 10,000  in each of these levels.(MMR  #  Per-03/MEN/1993).  According  to MMR#  KEP-
438/MEN/1992,  to form  a trade  union  at the  factory  level,  they  must  first  obtain  written  permission  from  DPC  SPSI
and  must  be registered  with  the  organization  at the  branch  level  (i.e.  SPSI,  since  there  is no  other  legal  trade  union).
13/This  appears  to be the  first specific  exclusion  of people  in management  positions  from  a workers  union.- 7 -
Termination  of employment  on the basis of union membership  is forbidden  by law but Indonesian
law does not specify the extent of union securityl.4/.  According to the law, union membership
contributions  and their distribution  to different  levels of the trade union organization  is to be determined
by the federation  of trade unions (in this case the SPSI center). In a recent interview  with SPSI officials
we were told that the distribution  of SPSI collections  between  different levels of the trade union were as
follows: 50% plant level, 25% district level, 15% province level, and 10% national level.  There is a
check-off  provision which determines  that employers  may automatically  collect the regular contributions
which  are then sent to an account  with the Ministry of Manpower  and then to the trade union. In addition
to members of the union, the Minister  of Labor could require an employer to extend to the non-union
employees  the same  benefits  to which  union members  are entitled. The Minister  of Labor  can also decide
that part or all of a collective  labor agreement  must be complied  with by employees  and employers  who
are not parties to the agreement  but are in the same field of activity. The law does not appear  to specify
whether  non-members  who benefit from a collective  agreement  may be required to pay dues.
Reports  on collection  of dues are contradictory. On the one hand, NGO's working  on labor issues
claim  that dues are collected  from all workers where there are plant level SPSI units (and in some cases
even when there are none) irrespective  of membership;  indeed to the extent that most SPSI units are
unions "on paper only" and not true representatives  of workers  collection  of dues from members  versus
non-members  is an irrelevant  issue. On the other hand, Chris Manning  (1993) reports that "despite  the
introduction  of check-off provisionsl5/ in 1977 and the subsequent revision of the law in 1984, the
union's central body still depended  on the government  for its operating  budget in the mid-eighties  and
many  members  made no financial  contributions." At any rate, the routing  of dues through  the Ministry
of Manpower  is indicative  of the extent of independence  of the SPSI from the government,  although  the
Ministry considers  it as part of its role in the establishment  and functioning  of trade unions. Moreover,
no change in the check-off laws have accompanied  the recent regulatory changes on setting up of
independent  sectoral and plant level unions. The apparent  lack of knowledge  and understanding  of check-
off laws by workers no doubt exacerbates  the lack of clarity in the law.
14/Union  security  provisions  have to deal with the tradeoff  between  the ability  of unions to be collective
representatives  of workers  on the  one  hand  and  the  excess  union  power  or violation  of an individual's  right  to work
on the other  hand. Unions  claim  that  union  security  provisions  which  usually  involve  some  kind of compulsory
membership  in the  union  as a condition  of employment  are  necessary  to prevent  the "free-rider  problem".  In other
words, unless  workers  are forced  to join a union  at the time of employment  or within  a period  of time after
employment,  they  may  have  no incentive  to  join unions  and  bear  the costs  associated  with  unionization  if they  are
going  to benefit  from  the unions  negotiations  by virtue  of being  employed  by the firm  or industry. Naturally,  this
would  weaken  the  bargaining  power  of a union  and  its ability  to function  and  some  sort  of union  security  is essential
for unions  to be able  to represent  workers  collectively.  Closed  shops  and union  shops  condition  employment  on
union  membership  (In  a closed  shop,  a worker  must  belong  to a union  before  obtaining  a job. Thus  under  a closed
shop  arrangement  the  right  of management  to select  workers  from  the labor  market  is severely  restricted;  it extends
considerable  power  to unions  to regulate  the  supply  of labor. A union  shop  requires  union  membership  within  a
certain  time  period  after  the  union  member  is hired. Thus  it is less  restrictive  on the  ability  of management  to hire
labor  but still  contradicts  a basic  constitutional  right-to  work  or right  of disaffiliation).  In an agency  shop,  workers
do  not have  to belong  to a union  at any stage  but are  usually  required  to pay dues  to the  union  if they  benefit  from
collective  agreements  negotiated  by it, thus  addressing  the monetary  costs  associated  with the free  rider  problem.
15/Where  employers  collect  contributions  on behalf  of the  union  and then  transfer  the funds  to the  union.- 8 -
Tables 4 compares the ratification  of ILO conventions  on freedom of association, the right to
organize  and collective  bargaining:  three of the six countries  (Korea, Chile  and the U.S.) have  not ratified
either of the 2 conventions. Yet all the countries  guarantee  freedom  of association  in their constitutions
and/or laws. Table 5 compares key aspects of the regulations governing the formation of workers
organizations  and the process of collective  bargaining in Indonesia  to those in the other five countries.
Only in one other country, Malaysia,  do unions  require prior authorization  from the government
in order to legally  represent  workers in collective  bargaining. Indeed, Malaysian  law gives considerable
authority to the Registrar and the Minister of Laborl6/,  and to employers who have to  "recognize"
the unions in a rather lengthy  procedure. The procedure  for employer  recognition  of unions in Malaysia
is reported to be quite exhaustive:  for example  only 33% of trade union attempts  to prompt employers
to take part in collective  bargaining  in 1988  succeeded  outright; the remainder  were still being reviewed
or awaiting formalities.  In all the other countries, prior authorization  from the government is not
required although  registration  may be necessary  to function  legally. While Chile and Mexico  do require
that unions must be of a minimum size (in Chile this varies with the size of the firm),  Indonesian
requirements  particularly  for unions  beyond the plant level are far more stringentl7/.
Legal plant or enterprise level unions may enter into collective  contracts in all six countries.
Korean law  requires that  all  enterprises establish labor-management  councils to  decide working
conditions18/.  Chile and Mexico permit more than one union at the plant level.  Chilean law is
especially  detailed on addressing potential  conflicts that may arise from multiple unions and collective
bargaining  agreements  at the plant level. Bargaining  beyond  the plant level, however, is more restricted
in the majority  of the countries.
As discussed  previously,  while Indonesian  laws permit collective  bargaining  to take place at any
level by a legal union, the laws regulating  the establishment  of legal unions in effect restrict collective
bargaining  to SPSI affiliated  unions.  The only exception  is the recent law for independent  plant level
unions, the effect of which remains  to be seen. In effect, collective  bargaining  cannot  take place by non-
SPSI unions beyond the plant level.  In Malaysia,  collective  bargaining  may take place at the enterprise
or higher level as long as unions  are legal (and have  been recognized  by the employer)  which also means
that they must consist of workers from a single  trade or industry.  The active  encouragement  of in-house
unions is a relatively  recent policy  in Malaysia  (attempt  to "look east" at Japan) although  in-house  unions
existed prior to the initiative. Malaysia has unique provisions for export processing zones: pioneer
companies,  mainly foreign  owned  that set up production  facilities  under the tax benefits conferred  by the
Investment Incentives Act are also privileged by the Industrial Relations Act  Employers in these
industries  may simply  conform  to the minimum  standards  laid out in the Employment  Act.  There is a
period  of prohibited  collective  bargaining:  which is usually  5 years coinciding  with the tax holiday  period
16/The  registrar  has  the  power  to refuse  or revoke  registration  under  certain  circumstances.  The  Minister  of Labor
has extensive  powers  in the Trade  Union  Act and may  suspend  unions  which  in his opinion  are being  "used  for
purposes  prejudicial  or incompatible  with  the interests  and security  of public  order of the country.."  as long as it
is cleared  with  the  Internal  Security  Minister  and  published  in the  gazette.  While  the  Minister  has  the  overall  ability
to change  rules and regulations  made  under  the Trade  Union  Act or to suspend  individuals  or classes  of trade
unions,  the Registrar  has considerable  immediate  power  over  the routine  administration  of trade  unions.
17/ However,  until  the  recent  past, the  minimum  representation  stipulations  in Chilean  law  were  considered  rather
restrictive  to the establishment  of unions.
18/Historically,  these  were  introduced  to weaken  unions- 9 -
but the Minister  can extend beyond the 5 year period and also extend the decision  to any other industry
as long as he/she notifies in the gazette.
In Chile, workers affiliate to enterprise level unions and while  plural enterprise unions, as well
as federations,  confederations,  central  are permitted, collective  bargaining  beyond  the firm level requires
the voluntary  cooperation  of employers. Collective  bargaining is also allowed  only after the first year
in operation  of an enterprise.
A collective  contract  in Mexico  can  assume  different  forms. Some  labor agreements,  entered into
by one or several unions with various employers  or employers' organizations,  cover entire branches of
industry rather than simply  companies, and are made mandatory by federal decree.  Such an industry-
wide collective contract is known as a contrato-ley.  This in  effect grants the government another
mechanism  of control over the labor relations process; the government decides whether to  issue a
contrato-ley  and whether  to make it mandatory. Thus, this can apparently  deprive  a significant  proportion
of the organized workers  and employers  in an industry  of the right to bargain independently.
In the U.S. the bargaining  unit appropriate  for collective  bargaining  is determined  by the National
Labor Relations  Board on a case by case basis and typically  is determined  by the autonomy  of the unit
(plant,  local plants, company  etc.).  An  employer  must bargain  collectively  with different  company  unions
on a coordinated  or coalition  basis.  There are many  thousand  local unions, many of which represent  the
employees  in one establishment  or company,  some of which represent those in a given  craft, and some
of which represent employees in the same industry working for different employers.  They play a
significant role in  collective bargaining, with many contracts signed between a  single local and
management or between a  coalition of locals of a  multi-plant enterprise and representatives from
management. In many unions, moreover, full agreement  between management  and labor requires not
only an overall national  or master contract  between  the union and employer(s)  but also local agreements
designed  to deal with the problems  and needs at specific  sites. Virtually all local unions are members  of
national or  international unions which  are  often important in  collective bargaining and  wage
determination. More than one industrywide  union can exist.
All the countries exclude from the right to collective  bargaining, individuals  in management  or
supervisory  positions,  etc.. In the U.S., professional  employees  may form separate  unions  but managerial
employees  are excluded.
In all the six countries, a collective  contract applying to the majority of the workers may be
applied to all other workers  in the enterprise (or establishment). In Indonesia, this decision is made by
the Manpower  Minister, in Chile by the employer  and in the other four countries it is automatic. The
intention  is to ensure  that inferior  conditions  are not negotiated  with  other workers. One potential  problem
that could  arise from this for the union, however, is a free-rider  problem where workers would  not have
the incentive  to bear some of the costs associated  with unionism  while potentially  benefitting  from it.
On the other end of the trade-off of course that considerably strengthen unions are union security
provisions  such as the closed  shop. Mexico  is the only country  that explicitly  permits closed  shops to be
negotiated  in a contract. Closed shops are illegal in the U.S. and Chile.  While union shops are illegal
in Chile, they may be negotiated  in collective  agreements  in Korea and in the U.S. in the case of intra-
state trade as well as in states  that have not forbidden  all forms of union security  ("right-to-work"  states).
Indonesian  and Malaysian  law do not have any specific reference  to union security.
In  the United States, union shops are  permitted in  collective contracts but  they can be
"deauthorized"  or voted out according  to specified rules.  Also, since national law states  that the only
condition  under which workers can lose their job for non-membership  is the non-payment  of dues, it- 10-
functions  like an agency  shop.  Moreover, national  legislation  applies only to inter-state  trade and states
can enact  their own laws outlawing  union or agency  shops for intra-state  trade. Until 1987, 20 states  had
enacted  "right-to-work"  laws and prohibited  all fomis of union security. These  were mostly  southern  and
south-westem  states. Union shop clauses  were found in 81  % of all labor contracts in 1987 reflecting  to
some extent the historical  prevalence  of industry in the north and northeast. Still, in right-to-work  states
where even agency  shops  are prohibited,  the laws  undermine  the ability  of unions  to bargain collectively.
Thus, to summarize,  laws regulating  unions  while  permitting  plant level collective  bargaining  may
restrict plant level collective bargaining by  independent  worker representatives  by  restricting their
organization as  in  the case of  Indonesia and Malaysia by  restricting their  formation into legal
organizations. On the other hand the imposition  of contrato-ley  type contracts by the government in
Mexicol9/ provide another way of restricting  work relations  governed  by contracts negotiated  between
workers and management. Chilean and U.S. laws are more favorable  to genuine  plant level collective
bargaining by independent  worker organizations. On the one hand, Mexican laws strengthen  unions
through union security provisions  while at the other extreme there is no reference to union security in
Malaysian  and Indonesian  laws and all forms of union security are prohibited  in most right to work states
in the U.S.
The Resolution  of Disputes  in the context  of Collective  Negotiations  and the Right to Strike
Restrictions  on the right to strike, apparent  inefficiencies  and delays in the process of resolving
disputes between  workers  and employers,  and the intervention  of the military in labor affairs are said to
further undermine  the ability of Indonesian  workers  to organize  and act collectively. The procedure for
resolving  disputes arising in the process of collective  bargaining  is provided in Act No. 22 of 1957 on
the Settlement  of Labor Disputes. This act was promulgated  to limit strikes and lock-outs  and in effect
also establishes  compulsory  arbitration. In response  to the recent criticisms,  three ministerial  decrees on
the  implementation of  the  act  (Decree Nos.  Kep.  342/MEN/1986, which explicitly sanctioned
coordination  by the MOL conciliator  with the Regional  Government,  Police Resort or Military District
to  overcome possible physical violence in the case of  a  strike, Kep.  1108/MEN/1986 and Kep.
120/MEN/1988)  were repealed  and replaced  with a new Ministerial  Decree (No. Kep. 15A/MEN/1994)
in January 1994.
According  to the existing  legislation,  the settlement  of disputes in industrial relations should go
through stages including  a corporate  or bipartite level settlement, mediation  by an official  appointed  by
the Minister  of Labor, and settlement  by regional  and central  committees. If direct bipartite  negotiations
between employers  and registered labor unions fail and arbitration is not chosen, strikes and lock-outs
should as far as possible be avoided  and mediation  may be requested. Mediation  must be conducted  by
an official  appointed  by the Minister  of Labor within  7 days.  If mediation  does not work, the case must
be transferred  to the regional committee  (P4D).  Regional  Committees  consist of 5 representatives  each
from government  (representatives  from 5 ministries),  labor and employer  circles appointed  and discharged
by the Ministry of Labor according  to a government  regulation.
Only if conciliation  does not work or if employers  refuse to negotiate  may workers strike  legally.
However, they must notify the employer as well as the Chairman of the Regional Committee  of their
intention  to strike. Workers must receive  an acknowledgement  of such a notification  from the Chairman,
which must be sent within  7 days of the receipt  of the original  notification  to strike. If mediators  notice
l9/And  Korea  and Indonesia.- 11 -
any strike and/or slowdown,  they must visit the location  and attempt  to negotiate  with the parties. If this
fails, they must transfer the cases to the regional committee2O/.
Regional committees  may make binding  decisions  unless an appeal of such a decision is lodged
within 14 days and the matter is not of a specific local character. If there is such an appeal or if the
Central  committee  (P4P, based in Jakarta  and consisting  like the P4D of representatives  from government,
labor and employers  appointed/discharged  by Cabinet  through Presidential  Decrees  upon proposal  of the
MOL through government  regulations)  decides  to withdraw  a dispute  for settlement  by itself, the dispute
is then transferred to the Central Committee  whose decision is binding unless the Minister of Labor
nullifies it or postpones its execution. Decisions of the P4P and P4D are upheld by the civil courts.
Nullification  or postponement  of a Central Committee  decision  by the Minister of Labor may only take
place if it is necessary  in his opinion  to maintain  public order and to protest the interests  of the state and
may only take place after consultation  with the other 5 ministers who are represented in the Central
Committee.
A regional/central committee  may decide to  hold an inquiry either if it requires additional
information  or if a strike (or lock-out) is contemplated  or has been taken by either of the disputing
parties.  In this case the right to strike is suspended  and the decision  of the regional/central  committees
is binding.
Thus, dispute resolution  procedures  are quite elaborate  and the right to strike exists, at least in
the law.  Yet there appear to be several problems  with this which in effect limit the ability of workers
to negotiate with employers.  First, the law assumes that workers will be adequately  represented in
disputes  by unions which does not appear to be the case.  Second,  the process is often subject to delays.
Third, NGO's question the independence  of the labor tribunal or the central committee. Fourth, the
procedure in effect sets up compulsory arbitration.  Fifth, the right to strike is severely restricted.
Finally, the military is often involved  to some degree or the other.
Chris Manning  (1993)  attributes  the increase  in labor  unrest in the late seventies  and early eighties
at least in part to the dispute  resolution  mechanisms  and to the lack of confidence  of workers  in the SPSI
as true representatives  of workers at firm level.  "Dispute  resolution  mechanisms  were inefficient,  and
did not have the confidence  of workers.  Delays of several months often occurred in the settlement  of
disputes through the regional and central government dispute committees.  Many firms which had
connections  with military  and political  leaders were able to resist formal government  and union attempts
to  resolve disputes and to  impose decisions which went against the firms'  interests.  The close
involvement  of military (and civilian)  officials in business...  .explains  how even  medium-scale  businesses
could gain decisions  in their favor or stalemates  despite major transgressions  of the labor code.  There
are also reports of corruption  among members of the committee and of their tendency to  favor
employers. Moreover, decisions  arrived at by the committees  have  no formal  status in the civil law code,
yet workers could  not afford to take matters further to civil courts if, as often happened,  SPSI failed to
negotiate a satisfactory outcome on their behalf."  and "The SPSI remained under tight government
control and did not develop  into an effective  national  union organization  or support  the growth  of genuine
form level union activities  ...... At the enterprise level, the fact that the SPSI was relatively  powerless  to
represent workers in case od dispute considerably  undermined worker confidence in labor's formal
representatives. Some SPSI units, especially  those operating  in large and more established  foreign and
20/The  new  regulation  also says  that "in the  case  of disputes  in industrial  relations  arising  beyond  the  provisions
in labor  laws,  the  settlement  shall  be integratedly  conducted  with  the  relevant  agencies  pursuant  to their  respective
duties  and  functions,"  a clause  which  being  interpreted  as still  sanctioning  military  involvement  by NGO's.- 12 -
domestic  firms, were active in negotiating  working  conditions  through collective  labor agreements,  and
in representing  workers in labor disputes. But many  were little more  than token  labor organizations,  with
leaders appointed  by management  and often coming from the ranks of management-personnel  managers
or supervisory  staff. They  received  little support  from their local  branches  especially  since  many  members
of the regional  boards of SPSI were military officials  or members of Golkar." (Chris Manning, 1993).
Workers thus typically  by-passed  the normal  industrial  relations  procedures  and sought  assistance
from the national  or regional parliaments  or from the Legal Aid Institute. Strikes did not last long but
there were protracted negotiations  between management and labor representatives  who were often
dismissed  subsequently.
Because  strikes are only permitted  within  the restricted  set of circumstances  described  above,  most
strikes that do take place are illegal. Finally, there is a ministerial regulation,  No. 4,  198621/, which
permits an employer  to dismiss workers if they are absent for 6 consecutive  days.  This regulation  has
apparently  been used to justify dismissal  of striking  workers. Moreover, Indonesian  law does not appear
to specify the extent of worker rights to reinstatement  or replacement  or wage payment in the case of
legal strikes. Since strikes are typically  not legal, this is of course currently irrelevant. Dismissal  cases
of individual  workers are to be resolved through regional committees  and mass dismissals  through a
central committee.
Even critics acknowledge that there has been a  fundamental change in the attitude of the
government  in recent years.  Military involvement  in labor relations while still prevalent is said to be
lower, particularly  in recent months. Employers  have reported that the military  has refused to respond
to their calls to intervene. Yet, even after  the repeal of Ministerial  Decree No. 342 on January  4, 1992,
the military  were reported to be involved  in 23 labor disputes to a greater or lesser extent in the month
of January alone22/.  NGO's and observers argue that military involvement  in labor affairs is still
permitted  through other regulation,  in particular  a Bakorstanas  (National  Intelligence)  1990  decree. They
also report that a major stumbling  block is the lack of independence  of the labor  tribunal or the P4P from
the government. Labor is still reported to be fired for attempts  to organize.
As discussed  earlier there has been a sharp increase in the number  of strikes in the 1990's, and
particularly in the last 2 years primarily associated with lack of compliance  with (and more recently
worker demands  for increases  in) minimum  wages.  The inability of workers to engage in productive
negotiations  with employers  stemming  from a lack  of confidence  in unions and their limited  representation
of worker causes and in the dispute  resolution  process  and its independence  can encourage  wildcat  strikes
and walkouts  as one of the limited  options available  to workers.
Table 6 compares  Indonesian  dispute resolution  procedures  and the right to strike with the other
five countries. Indonesian  laws in this area are in many ways very similar to those in Malaysia  (and to
a lesser extent in Korea) where the right to strike is very restricted  and in fact the Minister  of labor has
substantial  powers to intervene  in the dispute  resolution  process and may impose  compulsory  arbitration
through  the Industrial  Court. Neither  the Malaysian  Constitution  nor any statutory  law provides  the trade
union with a specific "right  to strike".  But this can be inferred by a whole range of statutory  provisions
in the Trade Union Act and Industrial  Relations  Act. A strike, to be legal, must be called  by a registered
21/This  is based  on reports  from  various  people. I have  not been  able  to locate  the regulation.
22/American  Embassy,  1994- 13 -
trade union on behalf of its members and must receive two-thirds majority in a  secret ballot23/.
Sympathy  or political strikes are not permitted: the strike must relate to a dispute between a group of
workers and their employer.  Just as in Indonesia there is a cooling-off period of 7 days after the
Registrar has been notified of the intention  to strike and a strike must be suspended  if the Minister calls
an inquiry or investigation. In fact it must be suspended if the matter is with the industrial court.
Malaysian  law does however  specify  that workers  who have gone on strike lawfully  cannot  be dismissed
on grounds of absence from work and workers may be represented by organizations other than a
registered trade union in the industrial court.  Workers may not strike over the enforcement of a
collective  agreement  since it is recognized  in the industrial court and is to be dealt with there24/ nor
can it take place over issues  considered  "management  prerogative"  as collective  bargaining  over these is
not permitted.
The arbitration  procedure  in the industrial  court is reported  to be often slow and protracted, due
to participation  of lawyers. The industrial  court in Malaysia  has its origin  in emergency  legislation  passed
in 1964  when external  military threat (due to the Indonesian  Confrontation)  was at its height.  Prior to
that, arbitration  was voluntary. The award of the industrial  court may not be challenged  for 3 years.
There has been a steady reduction in strikes since the 70's in Malaysia and in the workforce
involved.  Of course illegal and wildcat strikes exist and are never recorded.  Still, the effect of
government  sponsored  amendments  to laws in recent years have made it practically  impossible  for a well
run trade union to maintain  a strike for any length of time.  Strikes in Malaysia  are rare and do not last
long. In 1988, 5784 days were lost to strikes, little more than half for the previous year, though they
included  a major dispute  in the plantations  with the National  Union of Plantation  workers, the country's
biggest  union. There were 988 disputes  of all kinds during the year, according  to the Ministry  of Labor.
Korean  laws also similarly  set out elaborate  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  and the laws on strikes
resembles those of  the  other two  east Asian countries.  Once again, workers must notify the
Administrative  Authority  as well as the Labor Relations  Commission  (a tripartite body) and the employer
of the intention to strike and there is a cooling off period of 10 days.  Administrative  Authorities
(Minister  of Labor, Mayors,  Provincial  Governors)  may suspend  the strike if it prevents  normal  operation
of safety protection  facilities of workplaces and factories.  Just as in Korean Trade Union Law, the
Dispute  Adjustment  Law specifically  prevents  third party intervention  in various  collective  labor activities
and in a strike in particular. Strikes  are also prohibited  outside  the place of business,  over interpretation
of mediation  proposals and for 15 days following  referral of a dispute to arbitration. The Minister  of
Labor has the right to emergency  adjustment  which may lead to suspension  of a strike. While the law
does specify  that an employer  may not be allowed  to claim damages  which have been suffered from a
labor dispute against  a union or worker, it does not appear to be specific on suspension  or replacement
of striking  workers.
Despite its paternalistic  traditions, Korea does not lack for tripartite structures.  There are no
Labor Courts, but there are tripartite Local and Central Labor committees  which together provide a
dispute  resolution  procedure  which can lead on to civil courts. As discussed  earlier, all firms with more
than 100 employees  must have a labor-Management  Council, meeting at least quarterly with equal
representation  from each side.  After some disagreement  the government  accepted  in the autumn  of 1989
23/The ballot is valid for 90 days.
24/A newly  concluded  agreement  must be deposited  by the parties  with the registrar  of the industrial  court  and may
be amended  there.- 14 -
an FKTU proposal that there should be a  broad tripartite committee to  discuss a  wide range of
employment  issues.
The other three countries  on the American  continents  provide  a contrast  in their dispute  resolution
mechanisms  and especially  in the right to strike.  The labor codes of all these three countries are also
more specific  on liabilities  of workers in case of strikes. Chilean legislation  is particularly  detailed on
the right to strike. Mexico  requires  notification  of strike intention  and has a cooling  off period of at least
6 days (which varies across industries)  while United States legislation  does not require notification  of
strike intentions  and does not have a cooling  off period.  Chilean law dictates  that a strike may become
effective  on the third day after a majority  vote.
In Mexico, after the notification  of the intention  to strike is received by the Conciliation  and
Arbitration  Board (to which the employer must respond in 48 hours), the board sumnmons  both parties
for a conciliation  in an attempt  to avoid a strike.  If the attempt fails and work stoppage  begins, at the
request  of any interested  party within  72 hours, the Board  establishes  the legality  of the strike. Solidarity
or sympathy  strikes are permitted  in Mexico  which distinguishes  these from "justified"  strikes which  may
be attributed  to the employers  although  workers  do not have rights to wage compensation  in the former.
Strikes are permitted  over demanding  compliance  with a collective  bargaining  agreement. In the case of
legal "justified"  strikes the employer  must compensate  them for lost days of work. For all legal strikes,
wage contracts  are suspended  and even  temporary  replacement  workers  cannot  be hired. In illegal  strikes
workers must return to work in 24 hours after illegality  is established. Workers may not terminate
workers except in an illegal strike.
In Chile, when parties  have not reached an agreement  and the term of the current collective  labor
contract  has expired or more than 40 days have passed after a draft collective  contract affecting  one or
more enterprises  was submitted,  the workers  bargaining  committee  may chose to call a vote by which the
workers decide whether  to accept  the employer's last offer or to strike. Of course, the negotiation  must
not be subject  to compulsory  arbitration,  voluntary arbitration  must not have been chosen and the vote
must be called and carried out according to law.  For collective  contracts concerning two or more
enterprises,  the workers of each enterprise must state whether  they accept  the last offer or strike.  If it
is the latter, strikes exclusively  comprise the workers of the enterprise or enterprises in question.  A
strike is effective  if more than 50% of the workers involved  stop work.  Once a strike has been declared
and become  effective,  the employer  may declare  the total or partial lockout. A lockout  may be declared
if the strike affects more than 50% of the total workers in an enterprise  or establishment  or if the strike
implies  parallelization  of activities  which are indispensable  to safeguard  the functioning  of the enterprise
or establishment  irrespective  of the proportion  of workers on strike.  The judicial procedure in case of
dispute rests on the labor courts if the contract does not designate an arbitrator.  Arbitration  decisions
may also be appealed  at these courts.
In Chile, during a strike,  the employment  contract  is suspended,  workers  are not obliged  to work,
employers  are not obliged  to pay wages, benefits  or economic  privileges from the employment  contract.
Workers  may pay voluntary  contributions  to pension  fund and social  security. Employers  are prohibited
from offering  workers on strike individual  resumption  except as in the law.  Substitute  workers may be
hired from the first day of the strike, or striking  workers may be allowed  to work if certain  requirements
are met (i.e. they must be hired on the same terms as those existing  prior to the strike but adjusted  and
adjustable  in the future for the CPI). Permanent  replacement  workers may be recruited and workers  on
strike may return to work after 15 days of the strike under similar conditions. The legal maximum
duration  to a strike  has been removed  in the new labor code, but a strike  is considered  ended  if more than
50% of the workers return  to work. Then all remaining  strikers must return to work within  2 days. The
1987 code on the other hand favored individual resumption  of work over collective  resumption  thus- 15 -
weakening  collective  action. Workers can also vote on a settlement  by arbitration,  acceptance/refusal  of
last offer, acceptance/refusal  of written proposal of the employer. Compulsory  conciliation  which was
used until 1973  is no longer used to resolve  disputes.
In the U.S.,  although no notification of intention to strike is required, the law does require
notification  before termination  or modification  of a contract at which point the Federal Mediation  and
Conciliation  Services  assigns  a mediator. Strikes in violation  of no-strike  clauses  in collective  bargaining
agreements  are illegal.  Legal strikes are classified  as "Unfair Labor Practices" (for example  when an
employer  refuses  to bargain) or "economic"  strikes. The distinction  which is often  difficult  to determine
is established  by the NLRB. Employers  may hire replacement  workers in a strike. While in case of un
unfair labor practices strike the employer  must hire returning strikers even if replacement  workers are
to be displaced, this is not required in economic  strikes.  Employers  must however place returning
strikers on a priority list to be hired in future vacancies.
In the U.S., while  mediation  may  be made available  even without  a request  from the parties, there
is no requirement  that the parties use the services of the FMCS and mediation  awards are not binding.
In 1990, over 28000 contracts were negotiated  and the FMCS assisted in about 7000 of them.  There
were 711 strikes which amounts  to about  2.5 % of contract  negotiations. There is a reliance  on collective
bargaining to set forth dispute  resolution  procedures  and available  services  and this explains  why there
are very few strikes over the enforcement  of collective  bargaining agreements; almost every private
sector agreement has a grievance procedure.  They frequently provide for arbitration of disputes a
procedure  which has been successful  in the U.S.  Unfair labor  practice charges  are settled through  NLRB
procedures.
Latin American  countries  despite showing  a preference  for arbitration  in their legislation,  do not
appear to use it frequently  or successfully. This is true in Chile.  In Mexico  too, there is a preference
for direct settlement,  conciliation  through special authorities  and settlement  by courts.  Mediation  and
binding  arbitration  are less widely  practiced. Of course, voluntary  conciliation,  mediation  or arbitration
may be chosen in all six countries.
To summarize, important regional similarities emerge in a comparison of the procedures for
resolving  disputes  and in the right  to strike. The East Asian  countries  restrict the right to strike in several
ways: through  requiring  notification  of strike and a cooling-off  period, restricting  the subjects  over which
strikes are legal, and by suspending  the right to strike under various circumstances. In Malaysia and
Indonesia  conciliation  by a MOL  official  typically  occurs even before  a strike is anticipated,  and can lead
to a process which is compulsory  and in which decisions  are binding. The right to strike is much less
restricted  in the other 3 countries,  even though  Chilean legislation  for example  does not permit sympathy
strikes and Mexican law establishes  a cooling-off  period in strikes.  Collective bargaining contracts
typically establish processes for the resolution of disputes in the U.S.  and frequently provide for
arbitration,  a procedure  which has worked rather successfully  in the U.S. in contrast  to Latin American
countries. Although  strikes are easier, for example  in Chile and in the U.S., the number of strikes as
a proportion  of contract  negotiations  (2.5% in the U.S. in 1990, 4% in Chile in 1991/92)  is small.
Economic  Impacts of Unions
It is now agreed that unions can have both positive and negative impacts  on the economy (see
box).  The "monopoly"  face of unions can be associated  with higher wages in the organized sector, a
consequent  misallocation  of resources, loss in output due to  strikes and restrictive work practices
negotiated  by unions, high low-wage  employment  in the unorganized  sector which disproportionately0  V  0  a ...... .....  ..
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bargaining process to learn about and improve the operation of the workplace25/.  On the other hand,
if  management responds negatively to  collective bargaining  (or  is prevented by  unions from  reacting
positively), unionism can significantly harm the performance of the firm.  While management giving in
to exorbitant union wage demands can be associated with a decline in the organized sector, their reaching
sensible agreements with labor  could be mutually beneficial.  On the other extreme  is the case  where
management cooperates with racketeers who suppress union democracy and offer "sweetheart" contracts,
i.e.  contracts imposed by management without input from representatives of labor.
Several studies have attempted to measure the impacts of unions on wages, employment, output,
total compensation, productivity in the U.S.  Unfortunately, there are very few comparable studies for
developing countries.  Even the empirical evidence for the U.S.  is mixed and is based on varying data
sources, time periods and methodology.  On the whole, the union relative wage advantage in the private
sector  in  the  U.S.  lies  in  the  range  of  10  to  20%26/27/  which  vary  over  time  and  across
demographic groups.  The union relative wage advantage tends to be larger during recessionary periods.
Unions appear also to have improved the economic well-being of black men relative to white men, and
to reduce women's  wages relative to men since women workers are considerably less likely to be union
members than are males.  The overall effect of unions on the dispersion of earnings appears to have been
positive28/  in the U.S..  Available empirical evidence on the loss of output or the  "social loss"  from
unions suggests that the loss of output from the union wage differential,  restrictive work practices and
strikes associated with unions was estimated to be about 0.8%  of GNP in the U.S.
On the other hand there is considerable evidence in the U.S.  that unions do reduce worker quit
rates, alter the entire package of compensation allotted to fringe benefits and union workers were found
to be more productive  in many sectors than  non-union workers  (although less productive  in others).
Unions effects on productivity are neither constant nor always positive and vary across industries and time
periods as industrial relations practices vary;  increased wildcat or  illegal strikes associated with poor
industrial relations practices have been associated with loss of productivity.
The limited evidence from  union impacts from developing  countries (including Malaysia and
Mexico) suggests similar  impacts as in developed countries29/.  In most  developing  countries, even
when the right to strikes is not restricted, strikes are not common; most unions lack strike funds and most
workers lack the savings to carry out strikes.  The success of the East Asian "miracle" countries (Korea,
Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan) in the 1980's and the mid-1980's  success of Chile raises the question of
whether suppressing unions contributes to economic growth.  While the hypothesis has not been handled
25/See Freeman  and Medoff, 1984.
26/Evidence  from data between 1965-75  approximately. See Ehrenberg and Smith for a summary  of empirical
evidence  of union impacts. Earlier summaries  are available  in Freeman  and Medoff (1984) and Lewis (1986) for
relative wage effects.
27/ Since unionized  workers tend to have better non-wage  benefits, tend to be represented  in less flexible, more
structured  and more hazardous  work settings, and could potentially  be more able, ignoring  benefits in such wage
advantage  calculations  may understate  union compensation  differentials  while ignoring  non-pecuniary  conditions  of
employment  or worker ability may lead to an overstatement  of union total compensation  advantage.
28/Work  by Richard Freeman  suggests  this.  See Farber (1986?)  on exercising  caution in interpreting  some of the
available  empirical  evidence  on union impacts.
29/See  Freeman 1993  and references  therein. Also Panagides  and Patrinos  for Mexico.- 18 -
Underlying  Theories  of Union  Impacts  (continued)
An alternative  view to the monopoly  approach  to unionism  is the "institutional  response/collective  voice"  view of
unions. Proponents  of this view argue that there are important  ways  in which unions  can raise producitivity  of organized
workers  and can be associated  with greater  efficiency. Unions  provide  workers  with  an effective  "collective  voice"  at the
workplace.  that may  generate  productivity  improvements  given  appropriate  institutional  responses  from management.  Stated
more  broadly, this view is based  on the premise  that.  for various reasons,  the economy  may differ from a Pareto  optimal
world. The  existence  of important  public  goods  and externalities  at the workplace,  monopsony  and barriers  to  exit and entry
in labor markets, imperfect information,  profits and quasi-rents  (associated  with barriers to entry and differing  cost:
structures)  provide  opportunities  for  unions  to increase  economic  efficiency  and productivity.
The  productivity  enhancing  potential  of the collective  voice  model  of unionism  lies in the public  goods  nature  of
several working  conditions  and rules in the workplace  (safety,  lighting,  heating  and the firm's personnel  policies-formnal
grievance  procedure,  pension  plan, layoffs,  work-sharing,  cyclical  wage adjustment,  promnotion).  These  policies  affectthe
entire  workforce  and one person's consumption  does not exclude  someone  else's. Moreover,  the costs to an individual  of
changing  any of these  are likely  to be higher  than his or her share  of the benefits. Competitive  markets  will  providei  less
of these goods  than is socially  optimal  as there is an incentive  for individuals  to "free-ride."  Workers increase  their
bargaining  strength  by forming  labor  unions. The  availability  of collective  voice  makes  it less risky for workers  to reveal
their true preferences  as most countries  have laws that prohibit  firing  employees  because  of membership  in a union.  To....
enforce  equivalent  laws that protect  individuals  who express  their preferences  from job loss could  be more difficult  and
costly.
Proponents  argue further  that  unions  collect  information  about the preferences  of all workers  and enable:  fim  to
choose  a more  efficient  mix of waige  and personnel  policies. Unions  are likely  to represent  the:interests  and preferences
of the 'average' worker as opposed  to the "marginal"  worker (as would be the case in the absence  of unionism)  in the
determination  of some  of the public  goods  at the workplace. Thus for example,  outcomes  of collective  bargaining  such as
pension  or health insurance  plans  versus  take-home  pay will  take  account  of all workers  and appropriately  consider  the sum
of preferences  for work  conditions  that are common  to all workers. Such  contracts  can  be more  efficient  than the contract
that would  result in the absence  of unions.  .. . ...  i
Finally,  unions  constitute  a source of worker power enabling  better enforcement  of worker rights, dilutingt
authority  of management,  and offering  members  protection  through  a system  where  many  workplace  decisions.  arevbased&on
rules rather  than simply  supervisory  judgement  or whim  and  where  disputes  over  proper  mnanagerial  decision  making  on work
issues  can be resolved. The ability  of unions  to enforce  labor  agreements,  particularly  those  with  deferred  claims,  creates
thepossibility  for improved  labor  contracts  and arrangements  and higher  efficiency.
Thus,  the voice/response  theory of unionism  argues  that unions  increase  efficiency,  improve  income  distribution
among  workers  and can be expected  to be democratic. The efficiency  and higher:  productivity  results  from  nthesocially
optimal  provision  of public  goods  and design  of compensation  between  wage  and :non-wage  benefits,  the:  imnrased  flow  Of
information  between  workers  and managers  especially  at the Ievel of the enterprise  can lead to More  productive  work;
relations, and the lower quite rates associated with improved "voice' lead to lower training and,  hiring costs, less disruption,
increased  incentives  for investment  in firm-specific  skills. Positive  union  impacts  on income  distribution  could:  arisen  ut of
a political  process  in which  the majority  rules  and the greater  dependence  on rules to reduce  managerial  discretion.  Finally,
unions  could  be expected  to be democratic  and  important  social  organizations  because  they  require  the approval:  of a majorty
of members  and could represent  the political  interests  of lower  income  and disadvantaged  persons.
in careful empirical work, Freeman (1993b) and Fields (1994) argue that labor market repression is not
necessary for economic growth and may  been associated with high costs,  while unpublished work for
Korea shows that suppression of labor  in Korea  had high costs in terms of high accident rates and a
"disgruntled" work force.  Chris Manning argues that the continuing conditions of labor surplus rather
than government policies towards private sector unions was the driving reason for labor's low bargaining
power and real wage stagnation in the late eighties although the lack of sufficient mechanisms for worker
voice may  have contributed to the  worker unrest  and wildcat strikes.  In other words,  controls  over
unions are unlikely to be  the reason for  low wages;  which have more  to do  with underlying  market
conditions.- 19  -
Strikes
The strike is perhaps  the most important  source  of union  bargaining  power. Unions  are able  to win concessions
at the bargaining  table because  of their ability  to impose  costs on management,  which  typically  take the form of work
slowdowns  and strikes. A strike is an attempt  to deny the firm the labor services  of all union  mnembers.  Whether  a strike
or the threat  of a strike  can enable  a union  to win  a concession  from management  will  depend  on (i) the profitability  of the
ftirm  and its ability  to raise prices without  losing its market, (ii) the ability  of a union  to impose  costs on the firm, (iii)
whether  the firm has the financial  resources  to withstand  losses  during  a strike and (iv) whether  union members  have the
financial  resources  to withstand  losses  during a strike.
Given  that a strike  apparently  reduces  total  output  thus  necessarily  involving  losses  on both  sides,  economnists  have
puzzled over why they occur.  Various  models  of strike activity  include  explanations  such as imperfect  or asynmmetric
information,  the need for unions to strike periodically  to retain their credibility,  political models of strike activity
(Ashenfelter  and Johnson, 19?),  and total  costs models  of strike  activity.
In the Ashenfelter-Johnson  political  model of strike activity,  there is a divergence  of objectives  between  union
leaders  and members. The former  are concerned  with  the survival  and growth  of the union  ad their own personal  political
survival  in addition  to the termns  and conditions  of employment.  Union  leaders, who  have more  infornation  than  the rank-
and-file,  may have  lower wage  expectations. Rather  than risk dissension  with the union,  however, they can recommend
a strike,  which  will  serve  the purpose  of bringing  the expectations  of the unions  in line with  those  of the leaders. Thus  union
wage demands  will fall during a strike.  Although  the model is based on many restrictive  assumptions,  it provides  an
explanation  of why strikes  increased  in the U.S. in 1959  with  the passage  of the Landrun-Griffin  Act which  increased  union
democracy  and therefore  the chances  that the union  leaders could be voted out of office if they failed to satisfy  union
members'  expectations  at contract  negotiation  time. It focuses  only  on strikes  that result  from disagreement  over  economic
issues ignoring  those that may result from conflict  over recognition  procedures,  grievance  procedures,  unsafe working
conditions,  etc.
In the more  recent asymmetric  information  models  of strike activity,  either  firms or unions  or both do not have
perfect  information  about  the other  party's willingness  to make  concessions  or to resist. In such situations  the process  of
bargaining  may  increase  the accuracy  of the information  to each party  but  the bargaining  process  will  be slower  the greater
the initial level of uncertainty. A strike, by increasing  the costs to the parties of prolonged  bagaining, increases  the
incentive  to each  party  to reveal  its true position  more  rapidly  thus  leading  to a quicker  solution.  Thus,  a greater  initial  level
of uncertainty  about  an employers  willingness  to pay (for example  in the case of firms  with  widely  varying  profitability)  for
wage  increases  should  increase  both the probability  and the duration  of a strike.
In total  costs models  of strike activity,  because  strikes  impose  costs on both  parties, they will  try to reduce  the
costs of strikes, for example  by starting to bargain well in advance  of the expiration  of a contract. However, strike
avoidance  has a price so that strikes  will be more likely to occur when  they involve  lower  joint costs to managers  and
unions,  for example  in the case of durable  goods  industries,  goods  where  inventories  can be built  up, industries  where  there
are fewer domestic  and foreign  competitors  providing  substitutes,  and the higher  the strike funds  available  to unions  and
firns.
Indonesia is under pressure to ease restrictions on unions.  In considering future policy, it would
be important to consider that effective, democratic plant level worker organizations, by providing "voice"
at the workplace may be able to play a positive role and reduce some of the cost associated with worker
unrest.  Legislation encouraging collective bargaining at the enterprise level could enable workers  and
managers to negotiate outcomes relevant to the plant or enterprise that would enable workers to be more
productive  in  the  enterprise30/.  Improving  the  dispute  resolution  mechanism  and  the  ability  of
30/Collective  bargaining  at the industry  or national level could potentially  give considerable  monopoly  power to
unions (Note,  however, that the efficiency implications and the extent of monopoly power associated to different
levels of bargaining will depend on the market structure,  extent of  monopsony, competition, etc.).  On the other
hand, restricting bargaining to company unions has historically been a tool to weaken unions (for example in Chile- 20 -
workers  to be heard  can reduce the incidence of illegal or wildcat  strikes.  What  would be  needed,
however, would be more than legislative changes.  In order to move to a mutually beneficial industrial
relations system, appropriate and responsible changes in behavior from employers and workers in addition
to government are called for.  Careful changes in legislation, industrial relations practice and increased
deregulation  and competition in product markets  could improve the positive role that unions can play
while controlling the "negative" role.
B.  Minimum  Wages
The Indonesian Government responded to the greater  international scrutiny of labor standards in
the late eighties by focusing particularly  on minimum wage legislation.  In 1989 it revised the existing
system  of  minimum  wages  which  had  been  introduced  in  most  regions  from  the  early  seventies.
Minimum  wages  are  currently  regulated  through  Ministry  of  Manpower  Regulation  No.  PER-
05/MEN/1989  (amended in 1989 and 1990).  The minimum wage refers to a lowest basic wage/salary
plus permanent allowances where the basic wage/salary must be 75% of the minimum wage.  Minimum
wages are to be fixed based  on considerations of "minimum physical need",  costs of living and  labor
market  conditions.  There  is no  national minimum  wage but  regional  minimum  wages  (established
separately by sectors and sub-sectors) are fixed through Decisions of the Minister of Manpower.  The
1989 regulation states that minimum wages must be reviewed at least every two years.  A  1990 decree
requires  that the minimum  wage be adjusted  once a  year  in proportion  to  the  CPI.  Regional  wage
surveying boards3l/  propose  regional  (sectoral  and  sub-sectoral)  minimum  wages  which  have  to be
approved in stages by the Governors/Heads  of Local Government  and the Minister of Manpower.  A
National Wage Surveying Board provides technical guidance to regional boards.
Ministerial  decrees  announcing new minimum  wages  clarify  further  that the  minimum  wage
constitutes money  received in  cash,  excluding benefits  of an  incentive nature.  They  also  state that
sectoral minimum wages also apply to workers paid per contract/ unit/piece,  to workers on probation,
women workers,  and apprentices.  Minimum wages are established with a standard 7 hour workday and
40 hour workweek and are announced daily wages.  Legislation introduced in 1990 requires that increases
in the minimum wage be proportional to increases in the CPI.  While in 1994, minimum wage decisions
for different regions came out in three groups at three different times in the year, the Manpower Ministry
plans to regularize this further,  announcing new minimum wages once a year for all regions.  The gap
between minimum  wages and minimum physical needs  has been closing  and the Manpower Ministry
expects that in 1995, the average minimum wage will be above average minimum physical needs.  As
discussed earlier, failure to pay the minimum wage (and more recently demands for increases in minimum
wages) has been the major cause of strikes in the past couple of years.
under the Pinochet  regime, earlier legislation  in Korea, current legislation  for independent  plant level unions, and
decades  ago in the U.S..) Yet, since  collective  bargaining  at the plant or enterprise level can be important  for the
flow of information,  for example relating to specific working conditions, between  workers and managers  at a
decentralized  level, it should be actively  encouraged  by the law.
31  /This  are quadripartite  bodies  consisting  of representatives  from  labor, management,  government,  and  universities.
They also establish  basic-needs  figures (Minimum  Physical Needs  or "KFM") for each province which refer to
monetary  amounts  considered  sufficient  to enable  a single  worker  or families  of various  sizes to meet the basic  needs
of nutrition,  clothing, and shelter. KFM's are apparently  much higher than poverty  lines estimates  but are widely
accepted  as important  indicators  for evaluating  welfare  trends. Several  researchers  argue that  the KFM is actually
"quite  low."- 21 -
Table  8 compares key features of the minimum wage legislation with the other five countries.
It is clear that minimum wages provisions  in Indonesia are at least as generous as in any of the other
countries.  Malaysia stands out as the only one of the six countries with no minimum wage.  The other
four countries  either  have  more  exclusions  in  coverage  for  example for  apprentices or  workers  on
probation (U.S.,  Korea) and/or permit  certain non-wage benefits to be counted as wages (U.S.  and in
Korean law),  and, at  least at first glance have minimum wages set at  lower  levels relative  to average
manufacturing wages.  The minimum wage as a ratio of an average manufacturing wage was 0.51  in
Indonesia in  1991 and is likely to be slightly higher  in  199432/.  The real value of minimum wages
fell through the eighties in the U.S.,  Mexico and  Chile33/.  In the first quarter of  1993, approximate
calculations based on available data reveal that approx one-third of all manufacturing industry workers
had monthly income below  1.2 times the minimum wage while about 15% had monthly incomes below
0.8  times  the minimum  wage34/.  While not cast in stone,  these  estimates suggest that the minimum
wage may be more binding in Indonesia than in the other countries being studied35/36/
Minimum wage provisions are usually designed to guarantee each worker a reasonable wage for
his or her  work  effort and thus to reduce the  incidence of poverty.  Proponents  also argue that they
increase productivity.  Neoclassical economic theory,  on the other hand, suggests that such legislation
could have unintended adverse consequences.  Even in the case of full coverage, repeated minimum wage
imposition as in  the case  of the  U.S.37/  could be  associated with  a cycle of  short  run  employment
losses,  inflation reducing the real value  of the minimum wage and restoring employment, and then an
increase  in  the  minimum  wage starts  the  process  all  over.  In  a  growing  economy with  complete
coverage, the net effect of a one-time increase in the minimum wage is to reduce the rate of growth of
32/Minimum  wages  in Jakarta, for example, in 1994 are about 1.5 times their 1991  value.  Wage trends in 1993
Sakemas  data show that  nominal  manufacturing  wages  increased  at about 11  % between  1991  and 1992. Assuming
the same rate of growth for the next 2 years and assuming  manufacturing  growth rates in Jakarta are the same  as
the Indonesia  wide rates, this would make the ratio slightly above the 1991 ratio.  At any rate, with annual
indexation  to the CPI, this ratio is unlikely  to decrease  without  real wage increases.
_3/Although  in Chile real minimum  wages have grown at 7% per annum since 1989  while average wages  have
grown at 4% per annum  in real terms.
34/These are approximate  calculations  based on  available  published tabulations from the Sakemas household
surveys. In Chile, about 5-6% of workers are reportedly  at the minimum  wage and almost no workers are below
the minimum  wage. In Bell (1994) 1988  household  survey data showed  that 2.16% of formal sector workers were
below the minimum  wage, 24.18 were below 1.5 times the minimum  wage and 48.02% were below twice the
minimum  wage. For full time male workers in the informal  sector, the corresponding  numbers  were 16.48, 44.74
and 62.94 respectively.
35/See  Bell, 1994  for minimum  wages  relative  to income  distributions  in Mexico  and Columbia. The numbers  for
Indonesia  appear  to be more  like  the Columbia  numbers  where distortionary  impacts  of minimum  wages  were found.
Note that  the Columbia  numbers  were from manufacturing  firm data and may underestimate  the number  of workers
at the lower end of the income  distribution.
36/lnterviews  with  employers  inn Indonesia  suggested  that  smaller  labor intensive  firms such as small  garment  firms
appeared  to find the minimum  wage somewhat  problematic  whereas  the minimum  wage was not an issue for the
larger less labor intensive  firms.
37/In the U.S. the minimum  wage was typically  fixed in nominal  terms at about 55% of current average wage.
Rising  wages  in the rest of the economy  gradually  erode the minimum  wage and eventually  the process  is repeated.- 22 -
employment. In the case of incomplete  coverage,  which is far more typical  in developing  countries  given
the huge size of the informal sector, the imposition  of a minimum  wage may be associated with lower
employment  and higher wages in the covered  sector and higher low wage employment  in the uncovered
sector (as is the case with union negotiated  wages that are too high)38/.  Thus there are both winners
and losers, the losers more likely to consist disproportionately  of the less advantaged  (lower skilled,
younger  workers, women  with interrupted  work experience)  workers. There is reduction  in total output,
either through unemployment  or through a misallocation  of resources.
As discussed in the next section, minimum wages that are set too high could increase the
employment  loss associated with employer mandates and payroll taxes.  If wages are free to adjust
downwards, employers will typically pass on a substantial  fraction of the costs of such mandates to
workers thus reducing  potential employment  losses that could result.  Minimum  wages that are set too
high introduce rigidity and prevent employers  from passing on these costs to workers thus potentially
leading  to higher employment  costs than in the absence  of minimum  wage.
In developing countries with a  large informal sector (where it is more difficult to  enforce
minimum wages) in  which women are  more likely to  be  found, minimum wages benefit men
disproportionately.  Because  a larger fraction  of women  are also in jobs with more flexible  hours  of work
or part-time  work, minimum  wages set on a hourly basis may have fewer disincentive  effects for hiring
women than those set on a more lump-sum  basis such as monthly  wages39/. Minimum wages are set
on a monthly  basis in Chile, on daily  basis in Indonesia  and Mexico and on an hourly basis in the other
2 countries.
In the U.S., although  the precise magnitudes  of the relationships  are yet to be pinned down, it
is now widely agreed that increases  in minimum  wages  do reduce employment  opportunities,  especially
among  teenagers. Most research  has focussed  on unintended  consequences  employment  reductions. Very
little research  has addressed  the question  of whether  minimum  wage legislation  is achieving  its intended
goal of reducing the incidence  of poverty. The few for the U.S. that have considered  this have found
that minimum  wage legislation  has only a minor effect on the distribution  of income. This finding  is not
surprising because  not all low wage workers are members of low income families: e.g. teenagers. In
other words, minimum wages more directly affect low wage workers, not low income families.
Empirical evidence  from Mexico based on data from formal sector manufacturing  firms (Bell, 1994)
shows virtually no disemployment  effects for unskilled  workers primarily  because the minimum  wages
are set rather low relative to the distribution  of wages. However, the use of household  level data did
suggest  that the minimum  wage had an important  effect  on the unskilled  wage  distribution  in the informal
sector, affecting  in particular women  and part-time  workers.
It may be politically difficult to argue for elimination  of minimum wage and countries face
immense pressure to introduce or raise minimum wages as they develop.  In the U.S.,  instead of
elimination,  people are arguing for youth sub-minimum  or training wage. However, such sub-minimum
wages for particular groups while retaining  minimum  wages for the rest may end up benefitting  these
groups relative  to others, for example,  in the U.S. teen employment  at expense  of adult.
38/ Mincer  argues  that  under  some  circumstances,  it may  be rational  for  workers  to remain  unemployed  for a while
to search  for  jobs in the  covered  sector.
39/See  Gill, Sedlacek  and  Nayar  (forthcoming),- 23 -
It should be noted that there are at least two reasons why increases  in minimum  wages that are
set too high may not have dramatic employment  effects. The first relates to compliance. Enforcement
could be expensive and typically limited resources are spent on it4O/.  Enforcement  is particularly
difficult  when a large share of employment  is in the informal sector, such as Indonesia (the share of
informal workers as a percentage of non-agricultural  workers around 1990 was 63% in Indonesia
compared to 31 % and 25 % in South Korea and Malaysia respectively).  Non-compliance  with the
minimum  wage outside  of large businesses  in Mexico are common4l/.  Moreover unions, which could
potentially  be very important  in enforcing  minimum  wages are virtually  absent in Indonesia. In Mexico
too, union leaders are apparently  not very active in enforcement.
Second, employers  may respond  to increases  in minimum  wage by reducing  other forms of non-
wage compensation  that are not covered by minimum  wage law. e.g. holiday, vacation,  sick-leave  pay,
health insurance  and retirement  benefits  are now a large and growing  share of total compensation. There
has been recent evidence  of this in Indonesia  where employers  have been withholding  holiday bonus
payments  in response  to higher minimum  wage imposition. Therefore  minimum  wages that are set too
high can paradoxically  have smaller costs and employment  effects.
In conclusion  it will be argued  that any likely disemployment  effects  of minimum  wage laws that
are set too high will be  countered by non-compliance  and downward adjustment of other benefits.
However, introducing  unrealistically  high minimum  wages and the inevitable  non-compliance  that will
accompany  it will be associated  with higher costs associated  with worker unrest and protest.  While it
may be politically  impossible  to eliminate  minimum  wages, reliance on minimum  wages as a poverty
reduction  tool should be reduced, focussing  on alternate  poverty reduction  measures, particularly  given
the limited evidence  on the impact  of minimum  wages on poverty and its success in targeting  the poor.
Moreover, collective  bargaining  procedures  may in any case establish  wages above the minimum.
C.  Non-Wa2e  Compensation:  Emplover  Mandated  Benefits and Social Insurance  Systems
In Indonesia, the Jamsostek law was enacted on February 17 1992 in Law No. 3 of 1992 on
Workers' Social Security. Subsequent  government  regulations  laid down implementation  instructions  for
the  law  (Government Regulation No.  14,  1993, Minister of  Manpower Regulations Nos.  Per-
05/Men/1993  and Per-04/Men/1993).
Jamsostek provides the following social security benefits to  workers: (a) life insurance; (b)
retirement (provident fund) benefits; (c) free health care for workers, their spouses and upto three
children;  and (d) workers  compensation  insurance  for work  related  accidents  and illnesses. Every worker
is entitled  to Jamsostek  coverage, although  there is provision  for participation  to be phased in over time.
The current implementation  regulations  restrict initial participation  to firms with 10 or more employees
or a payroll  of more than one million  rupiah. For the health insurance  program,  employers  who already
have health maintenance  programs with superior benefits  need not participate  initially.
40/ln the U.S. limited  resources  spent  on enforcement  and penalties  are small.  Similarly,  in Indonesia,  although
the  government  is stepping  up enforcement  regulations  and penalties,  they  are  clearly  inadequate  as witnessed  by
the recent  strikes  and stop-work  actions  to protest  non-compliance  with minimum  wages.
41/Goldin,  1990,  Bell 1994- 24  -
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Most  of the  cost  of the  new  social  security program  is to  be  funded by  contributions from
employers, with a much smaller contribution (2% of wages for the old age provident  fund program)  from
workers.  These  are  fully  funded  programs,  without  any  provision  for  government  subsidy.  The
legislation requires the entire program to be administered by PT Astek, a state-owned enterprise, which
has thus far been responsible for administering the previous program which was more limited  (there was
no health component; contribution amounts were smaller).
The Indonesian old-age program is a fully funded, contribution defined program.  The benefits
to be received  at age 55 are the total contributions  paid in plus accrued interest. In 1991, Astek (on the
original program) reported a gross rate of return of only 14.4% on  its investment fund (i.e.,  before
allowing  for administrative  costs) while the average return from State Bank time deposits ranged  from
20-22  %  depending on  maturity42/.  Employer contribution is  3.7  %  of  payroll  and  employee
contribution  is 2% of payroll. The health insurance  program  provides comprehensive  medical  benefits
for the worker, spouse  and three children.  The employer  contributions  are independent  of the number
42/Chapter  by Ross  McLeod  in Indonesia  Assessment  1993. See  also, PT Astek,  1994  for investment  returns  and
prospects.V  L
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industry. It medical  benefits as well as disability  pensions  defined as a proportion  of earnings  varying
with the degree of disability.
Tables 8-10 compare  the legislated  social  security  program with those in the other five countries.
in the case of old-age pensions, the U.S. has a payroll tax financed, pay-as-you-go,  benefit defined,
mandatory  social insurance  system  as do Mexico  and Korea. Malaysia,  like Indonesia,  has a contribution
defined provident fund systems provided publicly, while Chile has contribution  defined, mandatory
private insurance. Schemes  such as those in the U.S. are likely to have a large wedge between  benefits
and costs and therefore could induce  distortions  in the form of lower employment  and output  (see box).
These  problems  are aggravated  by an aging  population  and a higher ratio of beneficiaries  (current old)
to contributors  (current workers).  Financial viability even in the short run, therefore would call for
relatively high contribution  rates which are even more out of line with the benefit rates (lower for
successive  generations). High contribution  rates in pay-as-you-go  benefit defined systems are likely to
he seen as a tax by workers, not the price for a service received. High tax rates could potentially  lead
to evasion  which further undermines  the financial  viability  of such a plan.  Employers  who cannot pass
on taxes workers, cut back on employment,  reducing output43/.  There is also considerable  evidence
of early retirement  effects in the U.S, system.
In the provident funds in Malaysia and Indonesia, which are contribution  defined, at least in
appearance  the wedge between  costs and benefits  does not exist. The Malaysian  system  requires a much
nigher level of contribution  (employee  10% and employer 12%, compared  to 2 and 3.7% in Indonesia).
On the other hand, publicly managed mandatory saving plans or provident funds have a record of
inisuse44/  and are often associated with low or negative returns for the pension funds.  They can
therefore essentially  be a hidden tax on labor, subject to misuse precisely because  they are hidden. To
the extent  that employees  do not value  these at their cost employment  losses  will result. The new Chilean
system  on the other hand is a contribution  defined  mandatory  private insurance  scheme  where the insured
verson  contributes 10% of wages.  There is a small redistributive  component  to the Chilean program.
Table 10 shows  that the other countries all have similar work-injury  programs primarily funded
by employer contributions. Malaysia  has a publicly provided and primarily  publicly funded (although
fees are charged according  to ability to pay) health care program.  In Chile, workers  may opt for and
contribute  towards a public or private provision.  The minimum benefits which consist of cash and
iiiedical  benefits are defined  in the public system;  benefits in the private system  vary although  they must
provide  benefits  at least comparable  to the public system. The U.S. has programs targeted  to the elderly
and poor with different degrees of government  contribution.  Chile, Mexico and the U.S. also have
unemployment  insurance  and family allowance  programs.
To summarize, new legislation in Indonesia has introduced a social security program that is
ambitious in  coverage and compares favorably to  those in  the more developed APEC countries.
Disemployment  and income distribution  impacts of such a program will depend on the extent to which
it constitutes  a tax on employers  and the extent to which employees  value the benefits. The greater the
extent to which  the benefits  are out of line with their costs, the higher  is going  to be the extent of evasion
43/ These impacts are likely to be stronger in developing countries which have limited tax enforcement capacity,
imperfect labor markets,  and large informal sectors.
_4Ainternal  Draft Bank Report on Old Age Systems.- 27 -
or non-complianice.  Public  provision of the prograrn necessarily  raises questions  of efficiency, returns,
corruption  etc45/.
D.  Other  Labor  Standards:  Hours  of WN'ork,  Leave,  Minimiuni Age of Employment
Table  1I conmpares  Inidoniesiaii  minimumn  standards with those in the other 5 countries.  The table
illustrates that they are at least as generous as those in the other five countries.  In Malaysia, pioneer
companies  cannot  negotiate collective  agreements  that grant  better  terms  and  conditions  than  those
provided in the Employmenit Act;  in other words,  these miniimlum  standards are actually  "maximum"
conditions of work in these companies.  In the U.S., there are fewer federally mandated standards: states
may have thleir  own laws, but  nmost  terms and conditions of employment are established by free collective
bargaining between labor organizatioins  and employers or  by  agreement between individuals and
employers  if no union has been certified/recognized. Federal law does lay down the minimum  age of
employmenlt  however.  In addition to ainual  leave, Indonesian law mandates leave with pay on 12 official
holiday.  With the exceptioni  of Federal legislation in the U.S.,  legislation in all other countries specifies
public holidays.  Indoilesian law is particularly generous relative to the other countries, in laws mandating
materniity and mzenistrual  leave for women.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
Current labor legislationi  in Indonesia is a mixed bag of protectionist legislation and controls over
organized  labor;  the  forme  r  a  result  of the  immediate post-independence protectionism  as  vell  as
governmnent  response  in recent years to  increasing criticisimi,  and the latter,  as seen in the monolitlhic
government  run  trade  union  structure,  a result  of  responses  of  subsequent  regimes  to  a perceived  threat
from organized labor to econorrmic  and political stability.
Whatever  the  motivation  for  the  interniationial  criticisms,  a  conparison  of  Indonesian  labor
legislation with those of five otlher APEC couiltries showed that Indonesian laws do  indeed restrict  the
ability of workers organizatio(is at the plant level to effectively represent workers to management.  In this
respect, they  comlpare with Malaysian laws and to a lesser  extent the new Korean legislation.  In part,
this is because Indoniesiaii laws, like Malaysian  laws,  have restricted the ability of workers  to legally
establish such organizatiorns  (although some legislative changes have taken place this year).  Lack of
clarity in the written law on union security, unfair labor practices etc. have left room for considerable
interventioni by  employers (and the state)  in industrial relations practice.  Restrictions on  the right to
strike, apparent inefficiencies, delays and partiality in the process of resolving disputes between workers
and management, and the intervention of the inilitary in labor affairs have further undermined the ability
of workers to organize and act collectively.  In all these respects, Indonesian legislation provide a stark
conitrast  from current legislationi  in Chile and the IJ.S. where legislation  appears  to be more favorable  for
plant level collective bargaining.
Oin  thie  other hand, Incdontesian  policies on millillmumn  wage, mandated non-wage benefits and other
labor standards appear to be quite generous  for a country at  its level of development;  indeed, on the
whole, they appear to be at least as generous as the countries studied here, which have (purchasing power
corrected) per capita incomlles  of at two and a half times thlat  of Indonesia.  Minimum wage legislation,
45/discussed  in greater (letail  in the chapter by Ross McLeod in Indonesia  Assessment,  1993.- 28 -
which  has been the reason for the majority  of the recent labor unrest in Indonesia,  has broader coverage
(fewer exclusions)  and appears to be at a higher level (relative to average manufacturing  wages) in
Indonesia  and is now indexed  to the consumer  price index  to maintain  its real value. Yet, Indonesia  has
the largest informal  sector employment,  very few resources  for inspection  and enforcement,  and very few
well functioning plant level worker organizations and grievance mechanisms; factors which make
enforcement  of such legislation  difficult. These factors  and management  practices  of reducing  non-wage
compensation  in response to increases in minimum wages raise questions about the reliance on the
minimum  wage as a poverty reduction tool.  On the one hand, minimum  wage legislation  if enforced,
could  potentially  benefit  better off workers relative  to less advantaged  workers. On the other hand, lack
f compliance  with the legislation  defeats  the purpose of such legislation. Increased expectations  on the
part of workers, on the other hand has been associated  with growing unrest.
A similar message  emerges  about other labor standards  where lack of compliance  is likely to be
significant. The implications  of the generally  protectionist  standards for potential  labor costs suggests
that low labor costs are probably not the motivation  for government policy and controls in the labor
market.  Further, relatively low wages are more likely to be associated  by the labor supply  conditions
rather than controls  over organized  labor.  Indonesian  standards compare favorably  with those in other
countries and compliance  will increase as the country develops  further.  Care must be taken not to
increase reliance  on centrally  mandated  standards over those established through negotiations  between
workers and employers.
Indonesia  is under pressure to ease restrictions  on unions. This paper has tried to emphasize  that
there may be a positive role that effective, democratic  plant level worker organizations  can play by
providing "voice" at the workplace.  However, changing such industrial relations practices in a way
involves  more than legislative  changes. In order for such a move to be mutually  beneficial,  appropriate
and responsible  changes  in behavior from employers and workers in addition  to government  are called
for.  Evidence  from developed  (and some developing)  countries  have shown that unions can have both
positive and negative impacts on the economy and that the potential positive role may have been
understated in traditional approaches to unions.  Careful changes in legislation, industrial relations
practice and increased deregulation  and competition  in product markets  could improve the positive  role
that unions can play while controlling  the "negative"  role.
Finally, it should be noted that at least two of the countries (Chile and Korea) studied had
legislation  that was far more repressive  of labor organizations  until relatively  recently. At least one of
these, Chile, has taken a clear policy  stance to reverse  the anti-labor  bias in its policies and has done this
by emphasizing  democracy  and representation  by worker organizations  at the plant level.- 29 -
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Table  1:  UNION DENSITIES
Country  Density  Year
Indonesia  5%  1986*
Malaysia  over 10%  1988
Korea  22%  1989
Chile  11%  1992-93
Mexico  25-30%  1992-93*
U.S.  16.40%  1990
SOURCE:  For Indonesian Figure, Economist Publication, Humana.
For all others, Longman Publication, Trade Unions of the World 1992-93.
*  Approximate year.- 32 -
Table  2: SELECTED  DATA ON STRIKES,  1961-91
(Per Annum)
No. of  % of all
No. of Strikes  No. of Workers  Working  Days  Strikes  in
Involved ('000)  Lost ('000)  Manufacturing
1961-65  40  23  42  34
1966-70  2  (0.4)  (0.4)  20
1971-75  5  1  1  75
1976-80  66  11  28  92
1981-85  112  27  142  87
1986-90  46  13  99  82
(1991-92)  146  63  447  n.d.
1986  73  16  109  77
1987  37  14  49  87
1988  39  n.d.  n.d.  82
1989  19  6  31  68
1990  61  31  307  89
1991  114  60  385  96
1992  177  67  509  n.d.
n.d.: no data.
SOURCE:  Chris Manning  (1993).- 33 -
Table 3:  MAJOR CAUSES OF STRIKES, 1985-91
(%)
Cause  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Wages  58  38  32  61  69  58  67
Annual  bonus  (THR)a  6  26  19  5  - - 9
Collective  Labour  4  3  - - - 3  2
Agreement
Formation  of union  1  3  8  10  5  6  8
Social  insurance  - 3  - 3  - 2  5
Other  working  30  27  41  21  26  31  9
conditionsb
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
N=  78  73  37  39  19  61  113
Tunjangan Hari Raya (Hari Raya allowance), the annual bonus for most workers
b Icluding dismissals/layoffs.
SOURCE: Chris Manning (1993).
a  Tunjangan Hari Raya (Hari Raya allowance), the annual bonus for most workers.
b  Including dismissals/layoffs.- 34 -
Table 4:  RATIFICATION  OF ILO CONVENTION  NOS. 87 AND 98
Ratified  Convention  No.
87 (Freedom  of  Ratified Convention  No.
Association and  98 (Right to Organize  and
Protection  of the Right to  Collective Bargaining)?
Organize)?
Indonesia  No  Yes, in 1957
Yes, by Peninsular Malaysia
Malaysia  No  in 1961 and by Sabah and
Sarawak in 1964
Korea  No  No
Chile  No  No
Mexico  Yes, 1950  No
United States  No  No
SOURCE:  ILO.  (As of December 31,  1993).
Membership in ILO  is very recent (1991 or  1992).- 35 -
Table 5:  UNION REGISTRATION, EXTENT OF SECURITY, ALLOCATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING  RIGHTS
Regulations on Formation of Legal  Property Rights to Represent Workers in
Unions  Collective Bargaining
Indonesia  A trade union at any level must be  Unions must be registered to enter into
registered at the Ministry of Labor.  binding contracts at any level. Collective
Registration of a federation requires  labor agreements by  "independent" unions
representation in a minimum number of  beyond plant level are still effectively not
provinces, regions, factory and minimum  possible in law.
membership in each factory unit.  A new
law permits establishment of independent
plant unions.
Malaysia  Registration is required to have rights and  A union must be registered and also
activities of a union.  Employer must  recognized by the employer by established
recognize the union.  Registrar has powers  procedure, as the proper body to represent
to refuse or revoke registration under certain  the class of workers who form its
circumstances.  Minister of Labor has  membership.  Members of a union must be
extensive powers and may suspend unions  of a similar trade or industry or within a
for security.  single enterprise.
Korea  Workers may organize or join a trade union  The representative of a trade union or those
at liberty. Enterprises must establish a  who are duly authorized by the trade union
labor-management council to decide  can negotiate a collective agreement.  Unit
working conditions.  trade unions may entrust the federation of
unions to which it is affiliated with the
power to negotiate.
Chile  Registration of Trade Unions does not  Workers affiliate to enterprise level unions.
require prior authorization at all levels.  Two or more enterprise level unions may
Law establishes minimum size and/or  coexist, unions may affiliate with others, but
representation rules for unions depending on  collective bargaining beyond the firm level
size of unit.  Unions may affiliate with  requires voluntary cooperation of
others; trade unions with confederations.  employers.
federations, centrals.
Mexico  Law  guarantees  freedom of association.  Only a trade union (not a coalition) may
Previous authorization is not required for  sign a collective agreement on behalf of
establishment of a labor union which can be  workers.  Unions can be craft, enterprise
established with at least 20 workers in active  unions, industrial unions, national industry-
service.  wide unions, multi-craft unions.  Union
must represent majority workers in an
enterprise/ establishment.
United  Employees have right to form,  join, or assist  Unit of employees must be appropriate for
States  labor organizations.  Unions must be  collective bargaining, i.e., employees must
selected by a majority of workers in the  have substantially similar interests regarding
bargaining unit.  Employer recognition of  wages, hours, working conditions.
the union as the exclusive bargaining  Bargaining unit may cover employees in one
representative can be settled by elections  or more plants of the employer;
conducted by National Labor Relations  apropriateness is determined by NLRB by
Board (NLRB).  case.- 36 -
Table 5:  UNION REGISTRATION, EXTENT OF SECURITY, ALLOCATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING  RIGHTS (Cont'd)
Application of Collective
Extent of Union Security  Contract  Union Dues
Indonesia  Termination of employment on  Manpower Ministry could require  Member contribution is as
the basis of establishment or  that the employer extend  determined by the Federation of
union membership is not  negotiated benefits to the non-  Trade Unions and should be
permitted.  No specific reference  union employees in  consistent with the constitution
to union securitv.  establishmenit. Ministry can also  and internal rules of the union.
decide that part or all of a  Automatic check-off is routed
collective labor agreement can be  through Manpower Ministry. The
applied to other employers/  law is unclear on collection from
employees in same field of  non-members who benefit.
activity.
Malaysia  Laws guarantee freedom of  Collective agreement applies to  As laid down in the rules and
affiliation and disaffiliation;  all members employed at the time  constitution of the trade union.
discrimination on the basis of  or subsequentiv in the enterprise  Decisions on the imposition of a
union status is forbidden.  No  to which the agreement relates.  levy, like other rules. are arrived
specific reference to union  at through a mandatory secret
security,  ballot.
Korea  Employment discrimination on  A collcctive labor agreement  Members must pay membership
the basis of union status is  (CLA) that applies to majority ot  dues every month (less than two
forbidden.  Laws guarantee  workers in an enterprise. will  percent of the wage thereof).
freedom of affiliation and non-  apply to all workers there.  If two-
affiliation.  Union shops are  thirds ot workers of the same kind
permitted if negotiated in  in a region are ulider a C'LA. at
collective agreements.  request of one or both parties of a
CLA or ex ofticio, the Labor
Relations Commission may apply
it to all similar workers in the
area.  A public announcement of
such a decision must be made
without delay.
Chile  Laws guarantee freedom of  Employer may apply the benefits  Unions are funded by voluntary
affiliation and disaffiliation;  stipulated by collective contracts  contributions of members as
discrimination and conditioning  to workers occupying similar  determined by the union.  Union
employment on the basis of union  positions or functions as the  fees are determined by union
status is forbidden (i.e.. closed  workers on the contract.  In that  statutes and must be approved by
and unions shops are illegal).  case, non-members may be  absolute majority, secret voting.
There is emphasis on freedom of  required to pay up to 75% of the  Non-members may be required to
disaffiliation and an agency shop  normal contribution  pay up to 75% of the normal
provision.  contribution if they benefit from a
CLA.
Mexico  Law states that "no one mav be  The provisions of a CLA cover all  Through member contributions.
forced to join or not join a  the employees of the enterprise or
union".  Yet, a collective  establishment even if they are not
bargaining agreement may contain  members of the union.  It may
a 'closed  shop" provision as long  exclude employees in positions of
as workers employed prior to the  trust whose contracts must
agreement who are non-members  however not be inferior.
of the union are not "prejudiced".
United States  Closed shops are illegal.  Union  A collective contract applies to all  Unions are funded through dues,
shops are permitted in inter-state  workers in a bargaining unit  fees and assessments which are
trade but they function more as  irrespective ot membership status.  voted upon by members.
agency shops due to law. States
can enact their own laws for intra-
state trade and can prohibit union
security.  20 states prohibited
union security in 1987.
Source:  Republic of Indonesia, 1988. 1992: Encyclopedia of Labor Law 1994: Republic of Korea. 1991: Secretaria de
trabajo.... 1992: unpublished document from Embassy of Chile. 1993: Taylor and  'Witney.  1987.- 37-
Table 6:  DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
Procedure for Resolving  Suspension or Replacement of
Disputes arising in  The Right to Strike  Striking Workers
Collective Negotiations
Indonesia  Settlement of an industrial  Workers may strike only if  The law is not specific.  But workers
relations dispute must go  negotiations with the official  may be fired if don't  show up for
through stages including  fail or the employer refuses to  work for 6 consecutive days.
bipartite negotiations,  negotiate.  Workers must notify
mediation by a Ministry of  the employer and the Chair of
Labor (MOL) otTicial  and  the Regional Committee of
settlement by regional and  their intention to strike and
central committees.  Central  may only strike after the Chair
committee decisions are  has acknowledged the receipt
binding unless nullified by the  of the notification (which
Labor Minister.  should be done in 7 days).  A
strike must be suspended if
there is an inquiry.
Malaysia  If direct negotiations fail,  Yes, if the strike is called by a  Workers who have gone on strike
conciliation by official of  requested Trade Union on  lawfully cannot be dismissed on
Ministry (or as decided by the  behalf of its members.  grounds that they have been absent
Director General. Industrial  Sympathy/ political strikes are  from work without reasonable excuse
Relations) may be requested.  illegal.  The decision must be  for more than 2 consecutive days as
The Minister is provided with  voted on by secret ballot,  provided in Employment Act.
the overriding power to  receive 2/3 majority and the
contain disputes through the  results communicated to
power to intervene.  The  Registrar in 14 days.  A strike
Minister may impose  can only be called 7 days later .
compulsory arbitration  It is illegal to strike if there is
through independent court or  an inquiry/ investigation  or if
call investigation/inquiry.  the matter is with the Industrial
Court.
Korea  If independent negotiations  The majority of the union must  The law is not specific.
fail, then upon notice of the  cast an affirmative vote on the
dispute, the Labor Relations  decision to strike. Notice of
Commission (LRC) appoints  the labor dispute to
conciliation by a conciliation  Administrative Authority and
commission.  If it fails, the  to the LRC must be made and a
LRC undertakes mediation  strike can only take place 10
through a mediation  davs later. T  he Administrative
commission. Voluntary  Authority (MOL/mayors/
conciliation, mediation or  Provincial Governor) may
arbitration may be chosen.  suspend a strike with approval
The MOL may decide if there  from LRC under certain
is need for emergency  circumstances.
adjustment in which case the
"dispute" is suspended and the
Central LRC may decide on
arbitration.
Chile  Apart from self-settlement.  If no agreement is reached and  Substitute workers may be hired or
voluntary mediation or  the contract term expires or  striking workers may be allowed to
arbitration may be chosen.  more than 40 days after a draft  work under the same terms as prior to
Mediation may only last 10  collective contract has been  the strike (but adjusted and adjustable
days after the appointment of  submitted, the workers'  by CPI).  The employment contract is
a mediator.  If no agreement is  Bargaining Committee may call  suspended, workers are not obliged to
reached, the mediator calls a  a vote to accept the employer's  work, employers are not obliged to
hearing where last proposals  last offer or to strike.  A strike  pay wages, but workers may continue
are submitted and the  is effective on the third  to contribute to social security.
mediator must present a  working day after approval if
proposal and parties must  more than 50% of workers in
reply in 3 days.  enterprise stop work.- 38 -
Table 6:  DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND  THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
(Cont'd)
Mexico  Labor disputes can be  Partial strikes are not allowed  For legal strikes all employment
resolved by direct settlement,  within establishment/enterprise.  contracts are suspended and even
conciliation, mediation,  Solidarity and "justified"  temporary replacement workers
arbitration, or by settlement  strikes are permitted.  cannot be hired.  If it is a "justified"
by Courts.  A hearing must be  Notification of the intention to  strike, the employer must meet the
held at conciliation and  strike must be given at least 6  workers' demands plus pay wages for
arbitration board to seek  days before. The union must  lost days.  Workers do not have the
settlement of a proposed  file the petition with the  right to wage compensation in
strike.  Within 72 hours of a  Council and Arbitration Board,  sympathy strikes.  If the strike is
strike its legal status may be  addressed to the employer, who  determined to be illegal, workers
requested from the board.  must respond in 48 hours.  must return to work in 24 hours.
United  Voluntary mediation, concilia-  Yes.  Strikes in violation of no-  Employer may hire replacement
States  tion and arbitration available.  strike clause in CBA illegal.  workers.  In case of ULP strike,
While parties are not required  Legal strikes may be "Unfair  employer must rehire the returning
to use the Federal Mediation  Labor Practice" or "Economic"  strikers even if replacement workers
and Conciliation Service  strikes. No notification of a  are displaced.  In an economic strike,
(FMCS), neutral conciliation  proposed strike is required but  the employer is not required to
is available through it and its  notification before termination/  displace replacement workers but
decision are not binding.  modification of contract is  must put returning strikers on
required to FMCS which is  preferred list for future vacancies.
used to assign mediators to
cases and for consulting.- 39 -
Table 7:  MINIMUM  WAGE LEGISLATION
Minimum Wage Established by  Monthly / Daily / Hourly Wage?
Law?
Yes (early 1970's)  Daily wage based on a 7 hour workday and 40
Indonesia  hour workweek.
No (Historically some minimum wage  Not applicable
fixing for special categories such as
Malaysia  shop assistants, cinema workers etc.
which is now redundant for all
practical purposes).
Yes (Since 1988; law was passed on  Hourly.  Also determined on the basis of a
Korea  Dec 31, 1986).  day, week or month but in these cases is also





Yes under Fair labor Standards Act  Hourly
(FSLA, 1938). Applies to covered
enterprises which have employees
United  producing, or otherwise
States  handling/selling/working on, goods
for interstate commerce.  States may
set higher minimum wages.- 40 -
Table 7:  MINIMUM  WAGE LEGISLATION  (Contd.)
Specified nominally or relative to  Includes the value of Non-Wage Benefits?
some other wage/price index?
Adjusted according to Consumer Price  No.  Includes basic wage and fixed
Index (CPI). Specified separately by  allowances received in the form of money
Indonesia  regions & sectors/subsectors.  excluding incentive allowances.
Reviewed regularly in recent years.
Proposal from regional (tripartite)
wage boards to go through heads of
local government to Minister of Labor.
Based on minimum physical needs
(KFM), cost of living and labor market
conditions.
Not Applicable  Not Applicable
Malaysia
Nominal.  A national minimum wage is Not typically. But definition of "wage" in law
determined according to category of  is "money and goods paid to worker by
industry, once a year, by deliberations  employer in the form of wage, salary or other
Korea  between Minister of Labor and  goods for labor service offered by worker."
Minimum Wage Council (tripartite).  Wages regarded as inappropriate for inclusion
Based on cost-of-living, productivity,  may be defined by Minister of Labor.
similar prevailing wages.
Nominal.  Based on a tripartite  No
Chile  agreement, wages are adjusted as per
the projected CPI and productivity.
Determined annually by geographic  No
zone and by occupation by a tripartite
National Commission. Takes into
Mexico  account for each family satisfaction of
material, social and cultural needs and
to provide for mandatory education of
children and condition of occupation.
Nominal.  In setting and adjusting the  Reasonable cost or fair value of board,
minimum wage, consideration is given  lodging, or other facilities customarily
to views of all segments of economy,  furnished by the employer for the employee's
United  including workers' & employers'  benefit may be considered part of wages
States  organizations in open hearings in  unless excluded under the terms of a bona
Senate and House.  Since 1938,  fide collective bargaining agreement.
adjustments were made effective in:
1949,55,61,63,67,68,74,75,76,78,
79, 80, 81, 90, 91.- 41 -
Table 7:  MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION (Cont'd)
Ratio of Current Minimum Wage  Coverage
to average Manufacturing Wage*
0.51  in Jakarta in Nov 1991.  All industrial workers regardless of employment
Slightly higher ratio likely for 1994.  status.  Includes contract/unit/piece workers,
Indonesia  probationary workers and apprentices.
Not Applicable  Not Applicable
Malaysia
0.25 (estimate for 1993).  All businesses/workplaces with at least 5
permanent workers except only family/domestic
workers. The minimum wage may apply to
some places with less than 5 permanent  workers
Korea  and is determined separately for workers below
the age of 18, with less than 6 months work, and
for piece work workers etc. by Presidential
Decree. It does not apply to workers on
L______________________________  probation,  training,  or to handicapped  workers.
0.2 (estimate).  100%
Chile
1990: 0.13 of average unskilled  Includes piece-rate and other workers.
Mexico  manufacturing wages (as computed
from firm level data).  Estimates from
household level data are higher.
0.45-0.5 until April 1990; 0.38 in  All businesses  with annual gross volume of
1991.  sales/ business of at least $500,000. Employees
of firms not covered may also be subject to
FLSA minimum wage if they are individuals
United  engaged in interstate commerce. Domestics are
States  included. Exemptions are narrowly defined.
Subminimum wages are certified by the
Department Of Labor for handicapped workers,
Itrainees,  students,  etc.
*Approximate estimates.  For Indonesia this is based on available published statistics, Chile and Korea
from Embassy Economic Units. Mexico, Bell 1994. Must be interpreted cautiously because of different
sources.- 42 -
Table  8: OLD AGE, DISABILITY  AND  DEATH PROGRAMS
Type of System  Coverage
Indonesia  Provident Fund System (lump-sum,  Establishments with 10 or more employees or a payroll of
periodical and partial lump-sum benefits)  at least I million Rupiah a month and those already on
earlier scheme.  Coverage is being extended gradually to
smaller establishments and to casual or seasonal workers.
Voluntary  coverage  is available.
Malaysia  Dual provident fund (lump-sum benefits  Provident Fund: employed workers.  Teachers and
only) and social insurance systems (disability members of armed forces in equivalent private plans are
only)  excluded.  Voluntary coverage for domestics.  Disability
pension: employees earning less than M$2000 a month
(or when first covered),casual workers and domestics.
Voluntary for those earning more than M$2000 a month
if employer and employee agree.
Korea  Social Insurance System  Korean nationals 18-59 living in Korea, employed in
firms with at least 5 workers. Voluntary coverage for
smaller firms and self-employed. Private school teachers
have separate systems (as do public employees, military
personnel)
Chile (new  Mandatory Private Insurance  Mandatory coverage for wage and salary workers.
system,  Voluntary coverage for self-employed.
1980,81)
Mexico  Social Insurance System  Employees, members of producers', agricultural, and
credit union cooperatives. Coverage is being extended
gradually to rural areas.  Coverage to be extended by
decree to agricultural workers, small businesses, forestry,
industrial cooperatives, self-employed, family workers,
domestics. Voluntary  coverage is available.  System of
Saving for Retirement (SAR) is mandatory for all
employees, and members of agricultural and credit union
cooperatives.
United  Social Insurance System  Gainfully occupied persons, including self-employed.
States  Exclusions: casual agricultural and domestic
employment, limited self-employment (annual net
income less than $400) and some Federal employees
hired before 1984.  Voluntary coverage for State, Local
Government employees covered elsewhere, otherwise
[mandatory.- 43  -
Table  8: OLD AGE, DISABILITY  AND  DEATH  PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Source  of Funds  Qualifying  Conditions
Indonesia Insured  person:  2% of earnings;  Old  Age Benefit:  Age 55 or retirement.  May be paid  before
Employer: 3.7% of payroll (plus 0.3% of  55 under certain circumstances. Disability: Total incapacity
payroll  for death benefit). Government:  for  work ani under  55. Benefits  may be paid to spouse  or
none.  orphan  children  in  case of death.  Payable  lump-sum,
periodical  or partly  lump-sum.
Malaysia  Insured  Person: 10%  of earnings  Old  Age: Age 55 & retirement  from employment.
according  to 306 wage  classes  for  Disability:  provident  fund-permanently  incapacitated  before
provident fund; disability  insurance,  55 with  2/3 loss of earning  capacity,  disability  pension-24
approximately  0.5%  of earnings  months  of contribution  in the last 40 months or in 2/3 of
according  to 24 wage classes. Employer: months  since  entry into insurance  with minimum  of 24
12%  of payroll  according  to wage  class  months  (reduced  pension  if contributions  in 1/3  months  with
for provident  fund.  For disability  minimum  of 24).Survivors  Benefits:  provident
insurance,  approx  0.5% by wage  class.  fund:nomination  as beneficiary  by insured.  Survivor
Government:  none.  pension:  death  occurs  while in receipt  of disability  pension
on or before  age 55. Death  benefit:lnsured  was under  age
60 at death.
Korea  Insured  person:2%  of earnings  in 1993,  Old-Age  pension:  Aged 60, insured  20 or more  years.
rising to 3% in 1998;  self-employed,  6%  Reduced  if age 60-64  and still  working;  if aged  60 or more
of earnings  in 1993  rising  to 9% in 1998. and insured  for 15-19  years;  aged 55-59  and insured  for 20
Employer:2%  of payroll,  rising  to 3% in  or more  years:  aged  45-59  on 1/1/88  and insured  for 5 years
1988.  Government:Administrative  costs.  after that date. Disability  pension:  Insured  at least I year,
not working. Survivor  pension  spouse/child/parent,  of
insured  (insured  at least I year) or pensioner. Lump Sum
refund  if insured  has less  than 15  years coverage,  if
requested
Chile (new Insured  Person:  old-age-minimum  10%  Old  age: men  age 65, women  age 60. 20 years  contribution
system,  of wage  or salary.  Disability  and  for new entrants. Early  retirement  permitted  if pension  at
1980,81)  survivor-approx  3.3% depending  on  least  50% of average  wage over  last 10  years and is at least
pension  fund administrator.  Employer:  equal  to 110%  of minimum  old-age  pension.Disablitiy: loss
None. Government:  Special  subsidies  for of 2/3 capacity  to work. Partial  disability  payable  if 1/2-2/3
guaranteed  minimum  provision.  loss of capacity. Survivor:  deceased  was covered  or was
Maximum  earnings  (adjusted  monthly  to  pensioner  at death  .
changes in the consumer  price index)  are
established  for contribution  purposes.
Mexico  Insured  person: 1.85%  of average  Old age pension:  Age 65, fractions  of pension  for age 60-64
earnings. Employer:  5.18%  of payroll.  if involuntarily  unemployed.  500  weeks  of contribution.
Government:  0.3%  of payroll  for most  Retirement  from employment  not necessary  if new  job is
workers.  System  of Saving  for  with  different  employer  and after 6 month  waiting  period.
Retirement  (SAR):  Employee:  voluntary, SAR:  Age  65, eligible  for social  security  pension  or upon
Employer:  2% of payroll.  Additional  5%  receipt  of employer  provided  pension. Unemployed  may
up to 10  times  of minimum  wage  to help  withdraw  upto 10%  of savings,  other  specific  withdrawals
finance  housing.  Government:  none.  permitted.  Disability:
50% reduction  in usual  earnings  capacity.  150  weeks  of
contribution.  Survivor:  Deceased  was pensioner  or had 150
weeks  of contribution  at death.  For funeral  grant: 12  weeks
of contribution  in last 9 months  or pensioner  at death.- 44 -
Table 8: OLD AGE, DISABILITY  AND  DEATH  PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
United  Insured person: 6.2% of earnings, Self  Old age 65 (62-64 with reduction);gradually increasing to
States  employed: 12.4%; Employer 6.2% of  67 over 2000-27.  Insured: 40  quarters of coverage (QC).
payroll; Government: Cost of special  Pension reduced for high earnings depending on age and
monthly old-age benefits for persons  earnings.  Disability pension: (disabled at least
aged 72 before 1968; whole cost of  Iyear):insured:  I QC for each year since age 21, upto year
means tested allowance.  Maximum  disability began; maximum 40 Qcs. Also 20 QC in 10 year
earnings for contribution and benefit  period before disability began. More liberal requirement for
purposes established.  young and blind.  Survivor pension : Deceased was
pensioner or had I QC for each year since age 21 and before
the year of death; maximum 40 Qcs. Reduced requirements
for orphans  and non-age  widow  with  eligible  orphan.- 45 -
Table 8: OLD  AGE, DISABILITY  AND  DEATH  PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Benefits  Administrative  Organization
Indonesia  Total employee and employer contributions  Ministry of Manpower-- general supervision.  Public
paid in, plus accrued interest  Corporation for Employees Social Security--
administration and operation of program
Malaysia  Old Age: contribution defined lump sum.  Ministries of Finance and Human Resources, general
Employee entitled to 1/3 of benefit at age 50  supervision.  Social Security Organization and
without retirement, receives remainder at age  Employees Provident Fund -- administration of
55. Housing withdrawals specified &  program; managed by tripartite governing board.
permitted. Permanent Disability: Pension-50%
of earnings plus 1% for each 12 months of
contribution over 24 months.  Maximum (65%
earnings) and minimum pensions (M$171.43
per month) are established. Maximum earnings
M$2000 a month for disability benefit
purposes.  Disability  Provident Fund-
contribution defined lump sum if ineligible for
pension and permanently incapacitated.
Survivor pension- percent of actual or potential
disability pension  of the deceased depending
on who survives upto maximum of 100%.
provident fund contribution defined lumpsum
payable to nominated survivors or legal heirs.
Contribution defined death benefit. Funeral
grant is M$1000.
Korea  Old Age: 2.4 times the sum of average monthly National Pension Corporation,  under supervision of
earnings of all insured persons in previous year  Ministry of Health and Social Affairs
and the average monthly earnings of retiree
over entire contribution period.  For each
insured year more than 20, the monthly benefit
amount is increased by 5%.  Permanent
Disability: Total disability--same as old age
calculation.  Partial disability--reduced by upto
40%.  Survivor: percent of pension, varying
with years of contribution.
Chile (new  Old-age: Contribution defined benefits.  Superintendent of Pension Fund Management
system,  Minimum pension (85% of minimum wage)  Companies-- general supervision; individual pension
1980,81)  guaranteed by government.  At retirement  fund management companies-- administration of
insured may make withdrawals from account,  individual capitalization accounts.
regulated to guarantee income for expected
life-span or buy annuity from private insurance
company or a combination of the two.
Disability: same as old age pension, minimum
pension guaranteed by Government.  Survivor:
percent of pension varying with conditions of
_survivor(s)  (widow/orphan  etc.).- 46 -
Table 8: OLD AGE,  DISABILITY AND DEATH PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Mexico  Old age (new formula):Benefit amount based  Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare-- general
on multiples of minimum wage in the Federal  supervision.  Mexican Social Insurance Institute--
District (I to 6 times minimum wage);increases program administration through regional and local
by 25% of minimum wage with average  boards in areas which coverage extended. Managed by
earnings and length of coverage._SAR:  General Assembly, Technical Council, Oversight
contributions made to a special account for the  Commission, & Director-General. SAIR:  Mexican
employee. Investment must yield at least 2%  Social Security Institute, program administered through
real return after commission and charges.  SAR Technical Community
Benefit may be paid as a lump sum or used to
purchase annuity. Disability: same as old age
pension including for the SAR.
Survivor:percent of pension varying with
condition of survivor (s). SAR: same as for old
age pension. Maximum and minimum survivor
pensions are defined. Funeral grant is two
months minimum wage  in Federal District.
Christmas bonus: one month pension.
United  Old age:  Based on covered earnings averaged  Department of Health & Human Services-- general
States  over period after  1950 (or age 21, if later) upto  supervision. Social Security Administration-- in
age 62 or death excluding the 5 years of lowest  Department administration of program through regional
earnings. Available at age 62, but reduced for  program centers, district offices, and branch offices.
each month of receipt prior to 62.  No minimu  Treasury Department-- collection of Social Security
benefit for workers reaching age 62 after 1981.  taxes through Internal Revenue Service, payment of
Monthly maximum for workers retiring at age  benefits and management of funds
65 in 1993.  Increment for each month that
worker delays retirement at ages 65-69;
amount depends on when worker reached age
62. Automatic cost of living adjustment and
dependents'  allowances are defined.
Maximum family pensions are defined.  A
means-tested allowance is payable to needy
under separate Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program.  Disability pension: similar to
old-age pension. Survivor pension: Percent of
pension depending on age and conditions of
survivors.  Means tested allowance payable
under Federal-State program to needy orphans.- 47-
Table 9:  SICKNESS AND MATERNITY PROGRAMS
Type  of System  Coverage  Source  of Funds
Indonesia  Voluntary  Social  Insurance  System  Firms  with  at least 10  workers  or  Insured  Person: None. Employer:
(medical  benefits)  expenditures  of I million  Rupiah,  6% of payroll for  married  workers,
who do not have  health  3% for  single  up to a maximum  of I
maintenance  program  with superior  million  Rupiah. Govemment:
benefits. Coverage  being  extended  None.
gradually  to different  industries  and
districts. Given  to worker,  spouse
and up to 3 children.
Malaysia  Medical  Care  available  in  Not Applicable  Not Applicable
government  dispensaries,  hospitals
and rural  health  centers. Nominal
fees charged  for persons  able  to
pay.
Korea  Social  Insurance  System. Medical  All pemmanent  residents  except  for  Insured  person: 1.5%  to 1.9%  of
benefits  only.  govemment  and private  school  standard  monthly  wages. Self-
employees  and those  covered  by  employed,  employees  in small  (less
Medical  Aid program. Separate  than 5 employees)  firms,  temporary
system  for private  school  teachers  workers:  amount  set by individual
and employees, and public  carrier. Employer: 1.5-1.9%  of
employees.  standard  monthly  wages.
Govemment:  partial  costs  of
administration  and of programs  for
self-employed,  temporaries,  small
firm  employees.
Chile  Social  Insurance  System. Cash and  Public  System:  All public  and  Public  System:  Insured  person:
medical  benefits.  private  sector  workers,  pensioners,  Wage  eamers 5.74%  of wage.
persons  receiving  work  injury,  Salaried  employees  6.55%  of salary.
unemployment,  or family  allowance  Employer:  none. Govemment:
benefits  .Private  System:  Covered  partial  subsidy. Private  System:
workers  and their dependents.  Insured  person:  Wage  and salaried
Persons  not  receiving  family  workers  and self-employed:  7% of
allowance  may  contract  in.  eamings. Employer:  none.
Govemment:  none. Maximum
monthly earnings for contribution
purposes.
Mexico  Social  Insurance  System. Cash  and  See Old  Age Pension. Coverage  is  Insured  person:  3.125%  of eamings.
medical  benefits.  continued  for 6 months  for workers  Employer:  8.75%  of payroll.
who lose  their  jobs.  Government:  0.6%  of payroll.
Maximum  and minimum  eamings
are established  for contribution  and
benefit  purposes.
United  Medical  benefits:  Health  insurance  Medical  benefits:  hospitalization,  Insured  person:  hospitalization,
States  for disabled,  health insurance  for  persons  eligible  for pension  at least  1.45%  (self-employed  2.9%) paid
aged,  cash benefits  (5 states).  65 years  old, some  others,  disability  by all workers  covered  for old age
Social  Insurance  systems.  pensioners  on roll  for more  than 2  disability,  death  and some  federal
years,  chronic  kidney  disease  employees;  cash benefits:  up to
persons. Cash  benefits:  Employees  1.2%  of taxable  eamings according
in industry  and commerce  in 6  to state. Employer:  hospital 1.45%
jurisdictions.  Contracting  out  of payroll;  cash  benefits  vary.
allowed  except  in Rhode  Island.  No.  Government:  hospital  costs  for
programs  in other  45 states.  some  uninsured.  Maximum
earnings  are established  for
contribution  purposes.- 48 -
Table 9:  SICKNESS  AND  MATERNITY  PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Qualifying Conditions  Benefits  Administrative Organization
Indonesia  Sickness and maternity benefits.  Medical benefits: Medical  Minister of Manpower-- general
None.  Medical Benefits:  Current  examination and treatment,  supervision.  Public Corporation
coverage  hospitalization, medicine, and  for Employees Social Security--
matemity care, dental care, eye  administration and operation of
care, family planning services and  program.
immunization. Duration:  2 months
of hospitalization (may be extended
in special cases).  Same benefits for
dependent.
Malaysia  Not Applicable  Not Applicable  Not Applicable
Korea  Current coverage, no qualifying  Workers: services by designated  Ministry of Health and Social
period.  doctors, clinics, hospitals including  Affairs-- general supervision.
medical exam, drugs, full maternity  National Federation of Medical
and nursing costs up to 2 children,  Insurance-- general guidance and
ambulance.  Patient copayments  support.  Medical insurance
vary from 20-55% depending on  societies (419 in total)--
type and place of care. No  administration of the program.
maximum. Duration: 180 days a
year per insured person (may be
extended under certain conditions)
Dependents: same benefits but no
maternity grant.  Defined funeral
grants.
Chile  Cash sickness and maternity  Sickness and Maternity: Public  Public System: Ministry of Health-
benefits: Wage earners and salaried  System: sickness-average  net  -general supervision.  National
employees currently covered, a  earnings in previous 3 months for  Health Services-- administration of
total of 6 months and 3 months of  private employees.  Maternity-  benefits and services.  Private
contribution in last 6 months.  same, payable for 6 weeks before  System: National Health Fund
Medical Benefits: all workers  and 12 weeks after.  Private  oversees individual health
currently covered.  System: vary with contracts, must  institutions.
be at least as good as public system.
Workers Medical: Public System
various types of care, no limit on
duration.  Private System: benefits
vary with contract. Dependents:
medical benefits same as for
insured person. In private system,
same as cash sickness and
maternity.
Mexico  Cash sickness benefits: 4 weeks of  Sickness: 60% of average earnings.  Ministry of Labor and Social
contribution immediately preceding  Minimum and maximum benefits  Welfare-- general supervision.
illness.  For casual workers, 6  are defined.  Maternity: 100% of  Mexican Social Insurance Institute-
weeks of contribution in last 4  average earnings payable 42 days  -program administered through
months.  Cash maternity benefits:  before and 42 days after, cash  regional and local boards.  Institute
30 weeks contribution by insured  sickness available if can't work 42  operates own hospitals, clinics,
woman in last 12 months.  Medical  days after, nursing allowance in  pharmacies, other facilities; also
Benefits: currently insured or  kind.  Workers Medical: medical  contracts use of some facilities.
pensioner.  services including hospitalization,
dental, etc. Payable for 52 weeks,
may be extended upto 104 weeks.
Dependents medical benefits: same
as for insured.- 49 -
Table  9:  SICKNESS  AND  MATERNITY  PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
United  Cash benefits:  minimum  insured  Sickness  benefit:  percent  of  Department  of Health  and Human
States  wage  in last  year ($300-$6600),  earnings  varying  by states.  In  Services--  general  supervision.
specific weeks  employment  in last  Rhode  Island:  supplement  per week  Health  Care Financing
year (4-20),  or combination  of  per child  upto  4 children.  Administration,  national  program
conditions. Medical  benefits:  Maximum  weekly  benefit  administered  in  cooperation  with
hospitalization,  pensioner  65 years  established.  Maximum  duration:  52  National  Health  Service,  Social
or older,  disabled  and entitled  to  weeks. Maternity:  same  as cash  Security  Administration  and State
disability  benefits  for  at least 2  sickness  benefits. Workers  Medical  Health  Departments.  Private
years,  or suffering  from chronic  Benefits:  services  furnished  by  carriers  and Public  agencies,
kidney  disease.  Other  medical  providers  paid by directly  by  serving  under contract  as
services:  meet  requirements  for  carriers  or refunds  to patients  by  intermediary  administrative  agents.
hospital  benefits,  election  of  carriers  of part  of medical  determine  and make  payments  to
coverage  and payment  of required  expenses. Hospitalization:  up to 90  providers  of services  or to patients.
premiums.  days; deductibles  defined  according  Includes  nonprofit  Blue Cross  and
to duration.  20%  copayment  for  Blue  Shoeld  plans,
most  other  medical  services  after  commercialinsurance  companies.
deductable.  Dependents'  medical  and group-practice  prepayment
benefits:  same  as for insured  plans.  Cash Benefits:  State
worker.  employment  security  agencies
(except  in New  York, Hawaii).- 50-
Table 10: WORK  INJURY  PROGRAMS
Type of System  Coverage  Source of Funds
Indonesia  Social Insurance Program  Social insurance program:  Insured person: None.  Employer:
Establishments with 1O  or more  0.24% to 1.74% of payroll,
employees or a payroll of more  according to risk in industry.
than I million Rupiah.  Coverage  Government: none.
being extended gradually to
smaller establishments.  Voluntary
coverage  available.
Malaysia  Social Insurance System  Employees earning less than  Insured person: none.  Employer:
M$2,000 a month (or when first  1.25% of payroll according to 24
covered, or voluntary agreement  wage classes.  Government: none.
by employer and employee), self-
employed, casual workers and
domestic servants.
Korea  Compulsory insurance with  Employees of industrial firms with  Insured person: none. Employer:
public carrier.  5 or more workers.  0.5% to 33.5% of payroll,
according to risk in industry
(average  2.21%).  Govemment:
costs of administration.
Chile  Social Insurance System.  Employed persons, government  Insurance person: none except if
workers, students, and some self-  self-employed.  Employer: 0.9%
employed persons.  of payroll, plus 3.4%-6.8% of
payroll according to industry and
risk (for wage earners and salaried
employees).  Employers may
contract out of system by offering
equal or improved benefits.
Government: none for private
sector.
Mexico  Social Insurance System  See old age pension.  Insured person: none.  Employer:
0.875 to 8.75% of payroll,
according to risk; average rate
4.42% of payroll.  Government:
none.  Maximum and minimum
earnings are established for
contribution and benefits
purposes.  Special system of rates
and benefits  for  self-employed.
United  Compulsory (elective in 3  Employees in industry and  Insured person: Nominal
States  states) insurance through  commerce generally, and most  contributions in few states.
public or private carrier  public employees.  Exclusions:  Employer: whole cost in most
(according to state) or self-  agricultural employees (1/5th  states and most of cost in others,
insurance.  states); domestics (1/2 states);  through either insurance premiums
casual employees (3/5  varying with risk or self-
states);employees of firms with  insurance.  Average cost in 1991
fewer than 3-5 employees (1/6  about 2.4% of payroll. Costs of
states). Coverage compulsory  pneumoconiosis benefits for
except in 3 states.  persons coming on rolls after
1973. Government: none. Whole
costs of pneumoconiosis benefits
for persons  on rolls before  1974.- 51 -
Table 10:  WORK INJURY PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Qualifying  Benefits  Administrative Organization
Conditions
Indonesia  Partial or total  Temporary Disability benefits: 100% of  Minister of Manpower-- general supervision.
disablement  earnings for first 4 months, 50% after.  Public Corporation for Employees Social
before age 55.  Permanent Disability: varies with disability  Security-- administration and operation of
No minimum  degree.  Maximum 70% of previous monthly  program.
qualifying period.  earnings times 60.  Death: funeral costs plus
cash benefit.  Workers medical benefits:
medical treatment, hospital care, medicines.
100,000-200,000 Rupiah for transportation,
medical costs up to 3 million Rupiah.
Malaysia  No minimum  Temporary Disability: 80% of earnings.  Ministry of Human Resources-- general
qualifying period.  Daily minimum. Permanent Disability  supervision.  Social Security Organization--
pension: 90% of earnings if total disabilitv.  administration of work-injury program;
Daily minimum.  Constant attendance  managed by tripartite governing board.
supplied up to maximum.  Partial disability:
proportion of full pension with degree of
disability.  Workers Medical:  medical
treatment, hospitalization, medicines
(government hospital and contracted
doctors).  Survivor: pension and funeral
costs.
Korea  No minimum  Temporary Disability; 70% of average  Ministry of Labor Affairs-- general
qualifying period.  earnings up to 24 months.  Permanent  supervision.
disability : Total disability- annual pension
equal to 138-329 days average earnings.
Partial disability- lump sum equal to  55-
1,474 days eamings according to degree of
disability.  Workers Medical: free treatment.
surgery, hospitalization, medicines. etc.
transportation, rehabilitation.  Survivor: lump
sum equal to 1300 days average earnings
payable to surviving family plus pension
defined as percent of annual earnings
according to number of people.  Funeral
grant:120 days average earnings.
Chile  No minimum  Temporary Disability: same as under cash  Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare--
qualifying period.  sickness benefit (up to 52 weeks, may extend  general supervision.  Administration of
to 104 weeks).  Permanent disability:  contributions and cash benefits through
pension: total-70%  of base wage. Constant  Social Insurance Service, Private Salaried
attendantance suppliment.  Partial: 35% base  Employees' Welfare Fund, and other social
wage.  Lump sum grant up to 15 months  security funds, and employers' non profit
base wage for less disability.  Workers  mutual insurance group.  National Health
medical: medicine, rehabilitation,  Service-- provision of medical benefits.
occupational training.  Survivor: percent of
pension depending on survivor. Funeral
grant is 3 times monthly minimum wage.- 52 -
Table 10:  WORK INJURY PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Mexico  No minimum  Temporary Disability: 100% of average  Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare--
qualifying period.  earnings up to maximum.  Permanent  general supervision.  Mexican Social
disability: pension-70%  of earnings.  Insurance Institution-- administration of
Christmas bonus: I month's pension.  contributions and benefits through regional
Adjusted with minimum wage. Partial  and local boards.
disability: percent of pension varying with
amount of disability.  Workers medical: full
medical, surgical, hospital, medicines, etc.
Christmas bonus: I month's pension.
Survivor pension: percent of total disability
pension of insured upto 100% depending on
survivor. Christmas bonus: I month's
pension. Minimum pension is same as old
age pension. Funeral grant: two months
minimum wage; pension adjusted in
proportion to minimum wage in Federal
District.
United  No minimum  Temporary DisabilitY: 2/3 of earnings in  Program administered by State worker's
States  qualifying period.  most states.  Maximum benefit according to  compensation agencies, in about 1/2 of
state; Payable if injury lasts 3 days - 6 weeks.  states; State Departments of  Labor in about
Additional variation in benefits with state.  3/8; courts in 3 States; pneumoconiosis:
Permanent disability: total-2/3 of earnings in  federal government and state.  1/3 States
most states. Defined monthly benefit for  have government workers' compensation
pneumoconiosis. Maximum weekly pension  fund; Employers must insure with  State
according to state. Payable for life or  Fund in 6 States; may insure with State or
throughout disability in 4/5 of the states.  private carrier in 14 States; and may insure
Partial disability- proportional to loss.  with private carrier in remainder. Most States
Worker's  medical :care provided as long as  allow self-insurance.
required in all states. Survivor Benefits:
pension-percent of earnings depending on
who survives. Defined benefits for
pneumoconiosis. Maximum pension defined.
Lumpsum funeral grant according to State.- 53 -
Table 11:  OTHER LABOR STANDARDS  AND MANDATED NON-WAGE  COMPENSATION
Hours of Work  Rest Period  Overtime
Indonesia  Maximum 7 hours a day or 40  At least 1/2 hour rest after 4  1.5 times wages per hour for the
hours a week.  May be extended  successive hours of work.  I  first overtime hour.  Twice
to 9 hours a day, 54 hours a  day rest a week.  May also  wage per hour for every
week with overtime pay.  change to 2 rest days a week  overtime work of the following
under 8 hour workdays with  days.  Separate rates for
agreement from workers.  holidays.  Pregnant and young
workers may not be hired
overtime.
Malaysia  No worker should work more  At least 1/2 hour rest after 5  Work on rest day: if work is for
than 8 hours a day, in excess of  consecutive hours.  If 8  less than 1/2 normal hours, I
a spread over period of 10 hours  continuous hours required, must  days wage at ordinary rate; if
per day,  more than 48 hours  get at least 45 minutes for meals  work is more than 1/2 but less
per week.  By mutual agreement  and recreation.  At least one day  than I full day's  normal hours,
can increase to 9 hours a day  rest per week.  2 days wages at normal rate.
up to 48 hours per week  For monthly salaried workers
maximum.  Law stipulates  rates of pay are 1/2 and full
maximums for piece rate, etc.  days pay respectively. Rates are
(12 hours per day).  3 times a days pay for longer
hours  and  twice  for holiday
Korea  Maximum 8 hours a day, 44  Not less than 1/2 hour for every  More than 1.5 times normal
hours a week excluding rest  4 hours and not less than I hour  wage for overtime work, night
period.  May be extended up to  for every 8 hours during the  work and holiday work.
maximum 12 hours a week with  course of work.  Exclusions for
mutual agreement.  Ministry of  hours per day and rest hours
Labor approval needed and may  with approval from Ministry of
order rest period/day-off  Labor.  One or more days off in
corresponding to extensions.  the week.  I day leave per
month  with  pay.
Chile  Maximum 48 hours per week,  At least I day a week.  50% surcharge for overtime.
spread out over 5 or 6 days,
maximum overtime 2 hours per
day.
Mexico  Maximum 8 hours a day, 48  At least one half hour per shift  Must be paid at twice the hourly
hours per week, 5 1/2 days or  (day/night/mixed).  One  salary, including holidays.
any other arrangement.  40  complete day of rest per week.  Overtime must be less than 3
hours is more common.  hours per day and cannot be
performed in more than 3
consecutive days. Overtime
beyond 9 hours per week must
be paid at 3 times the hourly
rate.
United  No maximum hours in Federal  No mandates in Federal Law  Federal law requires that
States  law.  employers must pay employees
not less than 1.5 times regular
rate for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours a week.- 54 -
Table 11:  OTHER LABOR STANDARDS AND MANDATED NON-WAGE  COMPENSATION
(Cont'd)
Annual Leave with Pay  Minimum Age of Employment  Menstrual Leave
Indonesia  2 weeks, calculated as I day for  15 years.  Conditions under  Female employees shall not be
every 22 days up to maximum  which younger children may  obliged to work on first and
12 days a year.  After 6 years in  work specified in law.  second day of menstrual period.
same organization, entitled to 3
months.
Malaysia  8 days for every 12 months of  Part X, "Employment of  None.
continuous service with same  Children and Young Persons",
employer, if employed less than  of Employment Act 265 has
2 years; 12 days if 2-5 years; 16  been repealed.
days if more than 5 years.  If
worked less than I year,
computed proportionately to
completed months in service.
Not eligible for leave if absent
without leave for more than
10%  of working  days.
Korea  10 days leave with pay for one  Minor under 13 years shall not  One day leave with pay for
full year service without  be employed except with  menstruation every month.
absence;  8 days if not less than  employment certificate from
90% attendance of one year's  Minister of Labor.
service.  For workers with
continuous  service of at least 2
years, I day for each
consecutive year. But may pay
wage instead of allowing leave
over 20 days.
Chile  15 business days per year, with  18 and above may be hired.  None.
an increase of one business day  Hiring of 14-18 with special
for every 3 years after 10 years  permission and protection with
of service.  regard to timetables, workdays,
and type of work performed.
Below 14 may not be hired.
Mexico  6 vacation days after one year  Not  available  None.
employment, 2 more days for
each additional year, up to 12
days.  From 5h year of
employment, 14 workdays'
vacation; every 5 years, 2 more
days.  Employers must pay
vacation premium of 25% of
salary earned during vacation
days; must be taken within 6
months and when suitable to
employer.
United  No mandates in Federal Law.  Minors under age 14 are under  None.
States  the legal age for employment,
newspaper  delivery  exempted.- 55 -
Table 11:  OTHER LABOR STANDARDS AND MANDATED NON-WAGE  COMPENSATION
(Cont'd)
Maternity  Leave  Bonus/Profit  Sharing
Indonesia  3 months.  1.5 months before and 1.5 after.  New ministerial decree (Sept. 1994) requires all
Maximum extension of 3 months before expected  companies to pay 13th month salary timed with
date with medical certificate  religious holiday.  This used to be strongly
recommended previously, will now be
compulsory.  Includes basic salary and fixed
allowances.
Malaysia  60 consecutive days and employer must pay a  None.
maternity allowance for this period.  Maternity
leave shall not begin earlier than a period of 30
days immediately before,  nor later than day
following confinement.  No maternity allowance
if at least 5 surviving children.
Korea  60 days leave with pay.  But more than 30 days  None.
shall be reserved for use after childbirth.
Chile  6 weeks before delivery and 12 weeks after  None.
childbirth, with a state subsidy.  Leave also
available with state subsidy to care for sick child
under  12 months (transferable to father).
Mexico  Not Available  Christmas bonus at least 15 days salary
considered part of the salary and must be paid
before December 20.  Employees must receive
share of  enterprise profits  as determined by
National Committee for Employees'  Profit
Sharing in Enterprise. Currently 10% of pre-tax
income, some exclusions.
United  No mandated maternity leave. However,  None.
States  discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirthor related maternity conditions
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